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VEF\N CO U I\ lTRYiVi AN AND TH E PATH OF PROGRE SSI VE
(AND PO PUUST) BANKR UPTCY SCHOLARSHIP
Darid A. Sheel, Jr. •

INTRODU CTION

The prorr: in:::nt la-vvyer and fo rmer Yale law professo r Joh n Fran k
re1ls of Ve rn C oun trym an's in volvem ent in th e case that even tual] ; becam;:: GYiswo ld 'V . Co n necticut .1 In Griswo ld , as most re ade rs w ill : .- ecall, the Supre1T1e Court struck d own a Connecticut statute th at prohibited the sale or use of contraceptives .
Accordin g to J ustic e
Dou glas 's m ajority opinion , th e statute violated the defend an ts' constit ution al right to privacy. Dou glas located this new right not in an:,·
specific constituti onal p rov ision but in the "penumbra" of sev eral provisions. To challenge t he statute, someone had to go out and buy contrace ptives. As F rank recounts, Countryman was the one who ini tia lly
vol u nteered :
[T]o create a test case, Ve rn bought some standard contracepti ves at a
V/algre en 's drug store in New Haven. Alas, he discovered that the sto re
was not a great national corporation as he thou ght; it was simply a franch ise operation [that is, Walgreen's stores were run not by Walgreen's itself, b ut by individuals who managed a particul a r store under a fran chise
ag;-eement with Walgreen 's] and any charge of ill egality would have been
against the poor feiiow who operated the store. Vern did not wa nt a test
case badly enou gh to victimize an individual a nd th e effort was abandoned.

To :r.nost b<:mkruptcy scholars of recent vintage, Countryman 's involvem ent in one of the most celebrated civil liberties cases of the cen tury would come a s a mild surprise. Countryman is remembered a s a
towering figure in bankruptcy. 3 (L iterally, as well a s figurativ ely: as
another pro:min ent friend has noted, "Vern was a big man , t all, 2.nd

'' Profe ssor of La\v, Uni versity of Pennsylvania. I am grate ful to Bill Drape r a t th e Biddle
Law Lib rary of the Un ive rsity of Pennsyh'a nia Law Sc hool for help in locati ng sourc es a nd a ssem bling rese arch; to Do uglas Baird , Kate Heidt, Eric Posner, and Bo b R as musse n for valuab le
comments; an d to the University of Pen nsylva ni a Law Sc hool for ge nero us summ er fundin g.
I .)81 U. S. 47 9 (1965).
2 Gera ld K. Smith , Vem Co untryman , NORTON BANKR. A DVISER , Jun e 1999, a t 2 , 5
(qu oting John Fran k).
3 Se e, e.g., N ick Ravo, Obitu a ry, Vem Co untry man, 81, P1·ojessor and Co mmerc ial Law Exf>nt , :,;.v. Tn·IES , l'day li , 1999, at A19.
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with chiseled features and a hard chin. "4 ) If bankruptcy scholars
playing a word ass ociation game were a sked what '.vord s carne t o
mind when they t hough t of Vern Countryman, nearly every one vvould
r es pond w ith the same two words: exec utory contracts. In 1973,
Countryman wrote a n article concluding that a contract should be
view ed as exec utory (a des ignati on that has enormous consequenc es in
the technical world of ban kru ptcy) 5 when the obligations o:f both parties are "so far u n performed t hat the failur e by either to cortlp1ete per-·
formance would constitute a material breac h. "6 \iVith its chara.cteristic
combination of scholarly ins ight and painstaking doctrin 2cl analysis,
the article al most immediately took on a life of its O\Yn . E -·/ en mor e
remarkable for th e m erc urial world of bankruptcy scholarship, t he article con tin ues to exert influ ence more t han two de cades later. Dozens
of judicial opinions and numero us law review a rti cles h ave p aid hom age to the "C ountrym a n definition" of executory contrac ts.'
If ba nkruptcy scholars would be mildly surpris ed to learn that
Countryman participated in the Griswold case, then the eyes of m a ny
would open still wider (as mine did) on hearing about the not-so-secret
events of Countryman's early career. As an assistant profe ssor at Yale
Law School in the rgsos, Countryman actively and pu blicly assisted
the defendants in several of the loyalty cases brought aga inst individu als suspected of Communist sympathies. 8 Countryman not only participated in individual cases, he also authored a book and several articles on the loyalty issue. 9 When Countryman was passed over for
tenure at Yale, he and many others believed that his activism in the
loyalty cases was the real reason. Undaunted, Countryman remained
a fervent activist on civil liberties issues throughout his long career,
which included a stint in private practice and the deanship at the University of New Mexico School of Law before he joined the Harvard
Law School faculty in 1964 .
Al tho ugh new bankruptcy scholars mi ght be surprised to learn of
Countryman 's in v olve ment in civil liberties issues, upon r efl ection they
should find the Griswold anecdote completely in character. The most

4

Smith , supra note

2,

at

2

(q uoting Professor Charles Alan Wright).

5 Under current law, if a co nt ract is executory, the debtor 's tru stee may re in state the contrac t,

eve n if the debto r defaul ted prior to bankruptcy. See II US.C. § 365 (1994).
6 Ve rn Countryman, Ex ec utory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I , 57 Mil'il\'. L. R E V . 439, 460
(197 3).
7 For a vivid example , see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functi onal Analysis of Exe cutory
Contmcts , 74 lVIIl\"N. L. RE V. 227 , 234-3 9 (1989).
s These eve nts are d isc ussed in more detail in Par t II.A ., infm.
9 See \' ER:--! COUN TRY'\IA N , UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIE S I:--! THE STATE OF \V.-\SHI:\"G TOK ( I 95 r ). Countryman 's artic les on loyalty iss ues include Vern Countryman, Th e Stmn ge Ca se
of Alge;- Hiss, 63 YALE L._T. 744 (I954) (book rev iew), and Vern Countryma n, Loyalty Test~· for
Lawyers, I3 LAW. GUILD REV. 149 (1953) [hereinafter Countrym a n, Loyalty Tests].
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telling detail, that Countryman abandoned his mission rather than
embroil "the poor fellow who operated the store" in litigation , hints at
the overriding theme of Countryman's remarkable career as a bankruptcy scholar. Countryman 's passion was to protect the little guy, the
indivi du al debtor who had run into financial trouble and filed for
bankruptcy. M any of Countryman's articles advocated reforms that
would assure greater protection for individual de btors. H e fought
tireles sly for the interests of de btors in organizations such as the
American Bar Association and the National Bankruptcy C onferen ce,
and he was a founding tru stee of the N ational Consumer Law Center.
For years, the Center has given the "Vern Countryman Award" to
"honor lawyer s who have contributed to the rights and welfare of hv.r··
income consumers." 10
Countryman is best known for the passion he brought to personal
bankruptcy issues, but he al so made important contributions - including the "Countryman definition" of executory contracts - in corporate bankru ptcy and other areas. To all of these endeavors, he
brought the same qualities: a fi erce integrity (which included an oftnoted tendency "not to suffer fools gladly" and inspired his classroom
nickname during his m any years at Harvard, "Stern Vern" 11 ) and an
absolute commitment to the correctness of the principles in which he
believed. 12
Vern Countryman's views on bankruptcy and legal issues place him
squarely within the progressive tradition in American thought, and it
is Countryman's role in progressive bankruptcy scholarship that I focus on in this essay.
The term "progressive" is used throughout the essay in its broad,
lay person's sense, to encompass not just the early twentieth century
political movement that bears this name, but also American populism,
which arose so mew hat earlier. 13 Scholars who identify themselves as
"progressive" frequently advocate the use of social data to motivate
legislative reform, identify with the socially disadvantaged rather than
Ravo, supra note 3, a t Arg.
Smith, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting former student Ken Kl ee).
12 An anecdote concerning Richard Nixon hints a t some of these qualities, a s well as Country m a n's political leanings. After Nixon's re election, Gerald Smith gave Countryman a bottle of
wine from the inauguration. Countryman's initial re sponse was to refuse to drink the wine. As
'vVatergate ran its course, however, the wine took on a new meaning. When N ixon resigned,
Countryman called Smith to say he would drink the wine with g re at pleasure. See Telep hone
Interview with Gerald Smith , Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Ariz. (Feb. 8, 2000).
13 Populism was characterized by a defen se of farmer s and rural interests, and a hostility toward Wall Street and other concentratio ns of wealth. Progressivism originated in urban areas
an d focused on social refo rm but shared populism's distrust of Wall StreH. To distinguish the
general term "progressive" from the political movement, I will capitali ze references to t he Progressive move ment. The best accoun t of populism a nd Progressivism is still RICHARD H OF STADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYA N T O FD.R. (1 955).
10

11
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the elite, and can be found at the liberal end of the political spectrum
on most issues. Although this essay refers more precisely to populisrn
or Progress i\·ism where the di stinction is important, the more gener':ll
term suffices for much of the a nal ysis.
To illustrate the historical sw eep of progressive bankruptcy scholarship , the essay begins by briefly describing the work of Countryman's most promi nent predecessor, vVillia m 0. Douglas. Douglas is 2. n
obvious choice to represe nt the origin, roughly seventy years ago, of
progressive ban kr uptcy schola rship. Douglas not only was the in teli:::ctual fat her of progress ive bankruptcy scholarship, he also serv ed a s
Countryman's prin cipal mentor afte r Countryman clerked ~;vit h th e
Justice in th e early r 94os. 1-1 For curren t progressive thinking, th e essay explores the work of Eli zabeth ·w arren . \Narren is the mo s :~
prominent current progressive, and - quite conveniently fo r my chronology - is widely viewed as Countryman's successor a s Harvard 's
reigning ban kruptcy authority.
In between, of course, came Vern Countryman himself. To la;,r the
groundwork for disc ussin g Countryman 's work and his enormous in-·
flu ence, Part I of this essay considers first the progressives who preceded and succeeded him, Willi am Douglas and E lizabeth V/arren.
The juxtaposition sugges ts that the concerns of current progressives
differ from those of the early scholars in crucial and interesti ng respects. To see how and why progressive bankruptcy scholarsh ip has
evolved, t he essay turns to Vern Countryman and his era in Part II.
This Part highlights three important differences between Countryman 's wo rk and that of Douglas, his mentor: Cou ntryman's emphasis
on personal rather th an corporate bankruptcy, his close relationship
with the bankruptcy bar, and his reaction to the em erging lavv a.nd
economics movement. Part II then shows the continuing p rominence
of t hese tendencies in current progressive scholarship. Part HI then
explores the significance of t he shift in perspective for the future of
progressive bankruptc y sc hola rship .15

14 Having joined the Su p reme Cou rt in 1939, Justice Douglas was still in his early years on tile
Co u rt w he n Co unt ryman arrived in 1942. P ri or to his a p po in tment, D ouglas had practiced
briefly for the firm of Cravat h, Swaine & M oore in N ew York, taught at C olum bia and Yale Law
Sc hoo ls, and ri sen to t he chair of th e Sec uri ties a nd Exchange Com mi ssion.
15 I should no te at th e outse t that my own bankruptcy sc hola rship wo uld not be c haracte riz ed
as progressive. My work fits more neatly within the law-and-economics lite ratu re, though I have
t ried to moonl ight as a prog ressive from tim e to ti m e. See, e.g., D av id A. Skeel, Jr., l1Ia1'kets,
Cow-ts. and the Brave New World o( Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. R EV. 465, 503-09 (usi ng
analysis from Karl Pola nyi 's 1994 book The G1·eat Tmnsfonnation to critici ze recen t law-and eco nomics p roposals).

\"l~R,\'
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I. B.-\ NKR U PT CY PP OG R ESS I VE S THE:'·T AND N Ov\":
DOTJ-G l ,.c\S A. ~ D \NARR E N

The or1g1ns of progressive bank.ruptcy scholarsb.jp date back, to the
r ise of American legal realisrn in tbe late r92os an d early I 9J05. As is
vve ll knovvn) the l-egal realists sought to O\terthro \v the reigni ng, Langdellian conception of la.w. ;:;ncl w replace it with a more h ighly· con t ex1
1 6
1 1~ ~-h o rvo··d c o'r- .-. : ,~,..... ,...l ) -, v
o!--\, ,<J..a
. ..... 1
-- ~'"' ta 1 ) '1'-J:'J l<! t"~ i-. . . ;{ '-/'"..--.,-1 " ca _:·o~J-""0:
r'J. C
., "
c:: ""t---e
. ... .!.:_..• -lv- l:-.
l .....-.
.! lt:.ll
:. £ 1 -___.: c
.... 1
Jt . ... .... .:..!...... l
.... V
historian of legal rca1isr!:. :'ft..lnc ti onalisru . . . refl ected an crtternpt to
und.erstand lav; in te r~n~.s c.~ :~- i-cs fa.ctual cor1text ar1cl econom ic ancl soci21.l
consequences."1 '
I-I ard as it is to i rr~ a. gi ~.-Ie n o\-1/, in an era -\·Vh en the 1nost hotly coxl·tested issu es so often cor~-::. c rr r::·rr.t constitution : :d la\v and otl1e-: l3U~) 1i c
law a reas, a disproporti o11?.t':: nu.m ber of the eariy legal realists established their reputations in corpo1·ate and commercial law.18 Among
this aug ust company, one a.c ade mic tovv·ers above the r est: liVillia.rn 0.
Douglas . It is no exagger ation t o say that, during the decade from
roughly r928 to 1938, Douglas figured prominently in every significa nt
development affecting bankruptcy lavv and bankru ptcy theory. 1 9 After
moving from Columbia to Yale in I 92 8, as part of the defection that
shifted the principal address of legal realism from New York to New
Haven, 20 Douglas ernbarked on the first important empiric al study of
1

1 ._~.! .1'......

~·- ) ., .!.-::.•.....

!.

•

.t

,::,

_

O~

.t·~cJ. i_L _~

1

16 In actuality, th e origins of iegal realism were more com pli cated tha n t his explanation suggests. For instance, pre-real ist Progressive s s uch as Roscoe Po und had already cha lle nged t he
Langdellian conception when l eg~ll re a li5m emerged. For a more nuanced overview of t he inte llect ua l history of lega l realism , se e Th om as C. Grey, Modem ,!merican Legal Th ought , 10o YALE
LJ. 493, 493-508 (1996) lre\·iew in g I'\.C: IL D UXBuRY, PATTERNS OF AMERICA!'·; J URI SPR1; DE NCE (1995)).
li LAURA KAL:VIAN , L EG:\L RL\l.IS~,I .-\T YALE: 1927- I96o , at 3 (1986).
IS Underhill Moo re, We sley Sturges, and Kar l Llewellyn all speciali ze d in commercial law. Se e
generally id. a t 20-35 (describing the early legal realists a nd th eir m eth odology); W ILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEW ELLY>: AND TH E R EALIST MOVEMENT 128-40 (1973) (d escribing
Ll ewe llyn 's early work on sal es la'N issue s) Much of J e rome Frank 's ~ar l y work brought the insigh ts of le gal realism to bear on corp o rate law and corpo rate reorganization. For illus t rati ons of
F ra nk's remarkable, and reso lutely legal reali s t, ins ights in to corporate bankrup tcy, see J e rom e
Frank, E pith et ical Jurispmd enc e and th e Work of the Securiti es and Exchange Com miss ion in
the Administration of Chapt eY X t!( the Ba;zkruptcy Act, r S N.Y.U. L. REV . .) I / (1 941 ), a nd
J erome F rank , S om e Realistic R ejlectio;zs on S om.e Aspects of C01·pomie Reorganisat ion , 19 VA .
L. REV. 541 (1933) [hereinafter, Fra nk, S ome Realistic R efl ec tions]. One of the agendas of t hi s
essay is to rekindle academic inte re st in t he ban kr uptcy scholarship of Douglas, Frank, and other
legal realists. A. re markable am o unt of cutting-edge th eory in the rece nt bankruptcy literature
was prefigured by these schola rs' writings in the r 930s.
19 Nor was Douglas 's influen ce li mited to bankruptcy. He was fam ously described in the !ate
19 20s as "the outstanding professor of law in the nation." }AMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT
jOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILUA!\I 0 . D OUGLAS 109 (rgSo) (quoting a statement attri b uted to
Uni\·e rsi ty of C hicago President R obert Hutchins).
20 The resignatio ns of Douglas a nd several other prominent legal realists were promp te d by
t he appointment of Young B. Sm ith rath er th a n H er ma n Oliphant as Dean of Columbia L a w
Schoo l. Robert H utc hins , who was then th e Dean of Ya le L a w Sc hool, took the opportunity to
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ban kru ptcy. Several years later, Joseph Kennedy, the chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as ked D ouglas t o oversee
the SEC 's investigation of corporate reorgani zation practice . Douglas's investigation would ins pire major reform in 1938 and w ould lead
Douglas fi rst to the chair of the SEC and tb::n , by 193 9, to the Sup reme Court. 21
Be cause D ouglas 's work played such a dominant wle , virtu ally d efi ning progressi<.jc bankruptcy theory in the I 930s , his vvritings are the
:Jbvious starting point for my analysis . T he first sec tion of this Part
the refore providss a. brief d escription and interp r etation of Douglas's
perspective on personal and corporate bankruptcy. T he picture that
emerges deriv es both fr om Douglas's empirical 1,vork and t heoretical
writings and from his interactions w ith othe r leading theorists.
T he section t hat follows skips fon:vard in ti me to the end of the
twentieth cen tury a nd considers current progressive theory. Given
that the current theorists are still actively writing, a nd history has not
ye t dete rmined whose insights will endure, it is more difficult to select
a theorist to complement William Douglas in the progressive line.
Sev eral scholars might plausibly be described as characteristic of current progressive bankruptcy theory. Nevertheless, nearly every bankruptcy scholar I know (including myself) would point to E lizabeth
Vlarren 's work as most representative of current progressive thinking.22 The second section therefore focu ses on 'Warren's contributions
to the bankruptcy literature.
Although there are important parallels between ·warren 's work a nd
D ouglas 's earlier insights, there also are striking differences. By a ny
me asure , late twentieth century progressive bankru p tcy theory differs
from its antecedents in remarkable respects . Whe reas Douglas regularly attacked bankruptcy lawyers , for instance, ·warren and other recent progressives are far more sympathetic to the bar. Douglas also

lure Do ugl as and U nder hill Moore to Yale. The best account of these events is KALMA N, supm
no te I? , at 68-78.
21 Do u glas's SEC career is de sc ribed in m ore detail in Part LA., infra .
22 The most p lausib le alternative would probably be Lynn L oPuc ki, who has written widely
on co rpo rate and pe rsonal bankruptcy a nd conducted a n influ enti a l study of large corpo ra te reorganization s w ith William Whitford. See, e.g., Lynn M . LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corpol'ate Go·verna nce in th e Banhuptcy R eorganizati on of Large, Publicly H eld Companies, 141 U. PA.
L REV. 669 (1993). Another le ading progressive , Jay We stb ro ok, is a frequent co-au t hor with
Warren and t herefo re a lso figures prominently in t his essay. Moving beyond main stream progressive ba nkruptcy sc ho larsh ip, th e most prominent femini st (and commu nitari an) has bee n Karen
G ross, se e KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY
SYST EM ( r 997), a nd David Carlson at tim es has brought aspects of postmodernism to bea r on
bankru p tcy theory, see, e.g., David G. Carlson, Phil osophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV.
134 1, 1389 (1989) (rev iewing TH OMAS JAC KSON, TH E LO GIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW (1986)) (" Th e whole idea of findin g a d ee p structure in a compl ic ated , hi storical artifact such
as the Bankru ptcy Code was doomed from the start.").
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was much more ho stile than current progressives to managers' efforts
to reorganize large corporations.
The differences in perspective raise an obvious question: Hovv did
progressive bankruptcy theory move from the concerns of the 193 0s to
the very different concerns of the I ggos? How did progressive theory
evolve from William Douglas to Elizabeth Warren? I argue in the
next Part t hat the answer is simpl e: Vern Countryman. Co untryman's
work, and the context in which it arose, provides the intellectual link
betwe en th e insights of the early progressive th eorists an d th ose of
their recent heirs. U nderstandin g Cou ntryman's influence and his era
can teach us a great deal about the path of progresstve bank rup tcy
theory.
A. Knocking Down Idols: Willimn Douglas
and Early Progressive Theory

In an article published some years ago, Steven Winter recounts a
famous midrash concerning Abraham, the patriarch of ancient Israel.2 3
Expanding on the biblical account of Abraham's departure from his
home country, ultimately to found the nation of Israel, the midrash
identifies Abraham's father as having been a maker of idol s - wooden
or clay statues of false gods. As Abraham grovvs up, he becomes more
and more skeptical about claims that the idols have magical powers
until, in a climactic moment, he smashes a row of idols in front of his
horrified father.
William Douglas and his fellow legal realists rose to prominence in
similar fashion, by smashing the idols of existing legal theory. T he
principal "idol" was the Langdellian approach perfected at Harvard,
which sought to discover fixed, abstract principles in the existing
caselaw and to apply these principles in a mechanical fashion to each
new case. 24 Douglas dismissed this approach as "library law." T he
"so-called case m ethod," he complained, "grossly oversimplifies and
distorts the nature of law" by ignoring the "other psychological, political, economic, business, social factors" that influence the law and legal
decisionmaking .25 Only by adopting an inclusive, contextual, interdisciplinary approach, Douglas insisted, could legal sc holars achieve accurate and useful insights about any given issue. It was in his bank-

2.l Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Betwee n Legal PoweY an d Narrative iv!eaning, 87 MICH . L. REV. 2225, 2226 (1989). Th e midrashes are a group of Jewi sh co mme ntaries speculating about aspects of the H e brew Sc rip tures. The Biblical accou nt of Abra ham
occurs in the book of Genes is.
24 For an influential recent analy sis of thi s approach, see Thom as C. Grey, Langdell's Qytlzo doxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. I, I r (I 983).
25 WILLIAM 0. DO UGLAS, DEMOCRACY AN D FI NANCE 280 (1940) (qu ote d wi th a pp roval
in J e rome Frank , Democracy and Finance, 54 HARV. L. REV. 905, 908 (1941) (boo k revie w)).

1082

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VoL I IJ I07S

ruptcy scholarship that Douglas sought most fullv to put these commitments into practice.
Bankruptcy law as Douglas found it looked quite different from the
insolvency framework that we now have. Under current law, almost
every bankruptcy involving an individual, partnership, or corporation
is included within a single statute. In the late rg2os, by contrast,
bankruptcy law was divided into two very different legal regimes, one
for small debtors and the other for large-scale corporate reorganization. If an individual or small business encountered financial difficulties, it invoked the first of these regimes, the Bankruptcy Act of r8g8,
which \Vas the nation's first permanent bankruptcy law. 26 Under the
relatively simple procedures of the r8g8 Act, an individual who filed
for bankruptcy w·ould turn over his assets to the bankruptcy court,
and a trustee would then sell the assets for the benefit of the debtor's
creditors. Then, as now, individual debtors were not required to give
up all of their assets, however. Under the laws of each state, certain
kinds of property were exempt and thus unavailable to creditors; the
list usually included items like household goods and property that were
essential to a debtor's livelihood. The r 8g8 Act permitted debtors to
exempt any property that was protected by the exemption laws of the
debtor's state. In return for giving up his nonexempt assets, the debtor
received a discharge from his existing obligations - that is, the existing debts were voided. 27 In its original incarnation, the r8g8 Act did
not offer a rehabilitation option designed for individuals. Not until the
1930s did bankruptcy law give debtors a choice between straight liquidation and proposing a rehabilitation plan.
The r 8g8 Act contemplated that, as with individual debtors, most
business debtors would have their assets liquidated and then distributed to creditors. The r8g8 Act did provide a limited reorganization
option. Under the Act's "composition" provision, a business debtor
could restructure its unsecured debt - obligations that were not collateralized by some or all of the firm's property - if a majority of unsecured creditors voted to accept the restructuring. 28 This provision

26 Act of July I, I898, ch. 54 I, 30 Stat. 544 (1899). For a detailed account of the political origins of the I898 Act and the reasons that it survived, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the
r8g8 Bankruptcy Act, IS BANKR. DEV.]. 32I (I999). Provisions of the current Bankruptcy
Code, Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at I I U.S.C
~§ IOI-I330 (I994)), which was enacted in I978, will be cited hereafter as sections of the "Bankruptcy Code." Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of I898 will be cited as sections of the "Bankruptcy Act."
27 In addition to exemptions and the discharge, a third crucial feature of personal bankruptcy
was and is the trustee's preference powers. To prevent some creditors from enjoying special
treatment, bankruptcy's preference provisions permit the trustee to retrieve payments and other
transfers made to creditors shortly before bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act§ 6o.
28 See Bankruptcy Act§ 12.
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was almost useless for large co rporate d eb tors, how ever, bec a use the
princip a l obligati ons of railroads an d other large corporations w ere secured, as noted bel ow, and the Act did not allow restructuring of secured debt. Even for sm a ll corporations, th e value of the reorgan izat ion option was limited .29 T h e assets of m ost bankrupt bu sinesses like th e assets of in d ividual d ebto rs - were simply liquid ated.
Well be fore the r8g8 Act, Wall Street in ves tment ban kers an d the ir
lawyers had cr eated a ve ry cli fie rent regime for addressin g the fin a ncia l distress of large co rporat ions, w hich , in the nin etee n t h ce n tu ry,
usu a lly were railroads. \Vhen nume rou s ra ilroads failed in th e nineteenth ce ntury, th e bankers and the ir lawyers persuaded courts to restruc ture the railroads throu gh a device th a t became known as an "eq uity receivers hi p."30 Most large railroads h ad raised cas h by se ll ing
stock a nd one or more classes of mo rtgage bond s - obli gations that
we re sec ured by pro perty of the ra ilroad - to numerous outside, or
"public," investors. If the r ailroad defaulted, a friendly creditor (usually one whom the managers themselves h ad handpicked) would put
the ra ilroad into receive rship and ask that the firm' s assets be sold in a
foreclosure sale . Meanwhil e, the banks that had served as the ra ilroad 's underwriters when a class of stock or bonds was first sold
would form a committee - called a "protective committee"- to n egotiate on behalf of the widely scattered investors who held that class of
securities. To establish a committee, the banks that had sold the
stocks or bonds would ask investors to "deposit" their securities with
the incipient committee . An inves tor who agreed to this arrangem ent
signed a deposit agree ment that gave the committee the right to accept
or rej ect a proposed restructuring plan on her behal f.3 1 Once the
committees were in place, their representatives negotiated the term s of
the restru cturing w ith the railroad's manage rs. The firm was then reorganized through a "s ale" to its existing creditors. In reality, the "sale"

29 T he co mposition prov ision a lso req ui red that t he debtor make its pri ority payments in cas h
at the tim e the reorgani zation was confirm ed. See H. R. REP. No. 75 - 1409, at 48-49 ( 1937) .
Small corporations foun d sati sfying thi s req uireme nt difficult.
30 Th e em ergence of th e equity re ce ivership procedure to reo rganiz e the natio n' s fir st large
corporatio ns t hat fail ed, t he railroads, is one of the great sto ri es of Ameri can lega l in ge nui ty. I
have de sc ribed t he hi story in detail elsew here. See David A . Skee l, Jr., An Evolu t ionary T heoyy of
CoYpomte Law and Corp o·mte Bankmptcy, 51 \'AND. L. REV. 1325, 1353- 58 (1998). F or an extensive overview of the rece ive rs hip pro cess by a lead er of th e reorgani zati o n bar, see Pau l D.
Cravath, Th e R eoYganizat ion of C orpomtions: Bondholden' and S tockholdeYs ' PYotective Committees; R eorganization Committees; and th e Voluntary R ecapitalizatio n of C01·pomtions, in SO?vlE
L EGAL P HASES OF CORPORATE FIN".\1'\C ING , R EORGAN IZATIO N AND RE GULATIO!\" 153
(19I/).
3! In theory, a nyo ne co uld for m a stock holder ·Or bondh o lder co mmittee. A ltho ugh ou tsid e rs
sometimes established competing committees, the underw rite r for the securities ha d an enormou s
ad van tage because it already ha d a list of a ll th e investors.
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simply reflected the terms to which the pa rties had agreed in their negotiations.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the same Wall Street professionals who dominated the issuance of securities to public investors J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, and a small
gro up of ot her investment banks, together with th eir attorneys - were
also the principal players in nearly every major reorganization. As I
describe below, thi s Wall Street hegemony triggered a sharp backlash
in the 1930s. For present purposes, the importan t point is that la rgescale reorganization developed in the courts, entirely ou tside the confin es of the I 898 B a nkruptcy Act.
D ou glas 's work took him deeply into both the ge ner al bankr u ptcy
prac tice governed by the I 898 Act a nd large-sc ale reorganization . H is
fir st major project, which he began in 1928, focu sed on b a n kruptcies
arising under the I 898 Act and illustrated the realists' preoccupation
w ith empirical investigations.32 Douglas complained that, although it
was obvious that many different factors contributed to finan cial distress, most observers were "content to leave the problem there."33
Douglas decried this passivity as inadequate and outmoded. "[T ]hose
who are interested in social reform and those who are interested in
problems of social causation," he insisted, must "go further." 3 4 By
"tracing the social, economic and legal antecedents, and by estimating
the causal processes," investigators could produce "results of tremendous practical and scientific significance."3 5
To remedy the lack of empirical data on bankruptcy, D ouglas embarked on a remarkable study of bankruptcy case s filed in N ew J ersey
from 1929 to 1930 and in Boston from 1930 to 1931. 36 Working with
bankruptcy and district court judges, as well as the Department of
Commerce, Douglas and his researchers conducted extensive interviews with hundreds of debtors and assembled case files on a total of
rsoo bankruptcies. Based on this data, Douglas explored a wide range
32 For an extensive history of legal realist empiricism and an ex ce llent, often critical disc ussion
of Douglas 's ba nkruptcy study, see John Hen ry Sc hlegel , AmeYiw n Legal Realism and E mpiYiw l
Social Science: Fm m t he Yale Exp eYie nce, 28 B UFF. L. RE V. 45 9 (1 979).
33 William C lark, William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, Th e Business Failure s Project
- A Pmblem in 1Vlethodology, 39 YALE L.J. ror 3, ror3 (1 930).
34 !d.
35 !d.
36 The arti cles that emerged from this proj ect include C lark, Douglas & Thomas, supm note
33; William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, Th e Bu sin ess Fai/u yes Project - I I. An Analysis
of iv!eth ods of Inves tigat ion , 40 YALE L.J. 103 4 (193 1); William 0. Douglas & J. Howard Marshall , A Fac tual St udy of BankYupt cy Admin istmtion and Some S uggestions, 32 C OLUM. L. REV.
25 (193 2); Willi am 0. D ouglas, Som e Functional Aspects of Bankrupt cy, 41 YALE L.J. 32 9 (1932)
[hereinafter Douglas, Som e Function al Aspects]; a nd Willia m 0. Dou glas, Wage Eamer Ba nkruptcies - Stat e vs. Fedew l Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591 (1933) [hereina fte r Douglas, vFage E arneY
Ba nkmptcies].
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of issues, including the quality of accounting records kept by small
businesses that failed and the relationship betvveen automobile accident judgments, gambling, or extravagant expenditures and bankruptcy filings .J?
The conclusions that Douglas drew from his study reve al a remarka bly thoughtful vision of the proper rol e of bankruptcy reform one that cannot be described as simply "pro-debtor" or "pro-creditor. ''38
The common theme in Douglas's findings is an assump tion th at bankruptcy sh ould be designed to promote self-relianc e and industry, and
should provide a second chance for debtors \Vho fail fo r reasons they
could not easily have controll ed. Douglas wor ried that credi to rs' ~ x
cessive lending m i ~ ht be a con tributing factor in the failures of some,
r) r even ma ny, debtors. "There is . . . a considerable body of opin ion ,"
he noted, "which traces [bankruptcy problems! to the ease with which
the debtor gets credit." 3 9 Debtors' right to file for bankruptcy and req uest a discharge was an important corrective to such inappropriate
credit prac tices . At the same time, Douglas strongly believed that
many debtors could avoid financial distress if they were encouraged to
manage their affairs more carefully. Several of Douglas's proposals
sought, in overtly instrumental fashion, to shape future debtors' behavior. For example, Douglas argued that courts should encourage
businesses to keep adequate accounting records by refusing to di scharge debtors that did not. 40 Similar limitations might induce more
debtors to obtain adequate automobile insurance, and to avoid gambling and excessive speculation. 41
Instead of devising clear rules to achieve these goals, Douglas, like
many legal realists, was a fervent advocate of judicial and administrative discretio n. In his discussion of speculation and gambling, for instance, Douglas insisted: "[An] attempt to treat all cases of speculation
and gambling categorically would be absurd. It would seem desirable,
however, to provide administrators with discretionary power so as to
3i As thi s overview sugge sts, the study was enorm ously detailed and thus rather in tr usive for
the debtors in vo lved (w ho were under substantial press ure to respond because the study bo re th e
imprimatur of the judge). Douglas's biographer suggests that the methods "wou ld hav e been onerou s to the fu ture Ju stice Douglas, who defined the constitutional ri ght of privac y." SIMON, su pm note 19, at II3.
38 For an arg um ent that Douglas 's theoretical conclusions were only loosely tied to his empirical findings, see Schlege l, supra note 32, at 53 0- 31. Schlegel argues that Douglas and other earl y
legal realists faced a te nsion between their commitment to empiricism a nd their desire to ach ieve
immediate social reform . On this view, Douglas abandoned hi s empiricism in order to pursue social cha nge.
39 William 0. Douglas, Bankruptcy, in E NCY CLOPAEDI A OF THE SOCIAL SCIE NCES 44 9,
453 (Edwin RA. Seligman ed., 1937).
40 See, e. g., Douglas, Some Functional Aspec ts, supra note 36 , at 33 8- 39 .
41 See id. at 343 (a utomobile judgment s); id. at 346- 47 (spec ulati on and gamblin g). Douglas
included stock speculation within his definition of inappropriate risk taking.

ro86

HARVARD LlW REV!EfV

take cognizance of the variants among the cases." 42 The principal inspiration for Douglas's preferred approach was English bankrup tcy
law:13 Unlike the U.S. law, which contemplated that courts would
grant (or on rare occasions, deny) a debtor's discharge shortly after he
filed for bankruptcy, the English approach gave the decisionmaker far
more discretion. In England, the decisionmaker could delay or impose
conditions on the discharge rather than give an immediate thumbs up
or thumbs down - an option English officials exercised more than
ninety percent of the time. 44 The great virtue of adopting a flexible
approach to discharge, Douglas argued, \Va.s that it would enable the
decisionmaker to create a solution tailored to th e circumstances and
needs of the particular debtor. 45
1..J nderlying all of Douglas's views was the conviction that lcnvmakers should "experiment" and consider radical change where necessary.
This commitment to experimental reform brought Douglas into direct
conflict with bankruptcy professionals and the bankruptcy bar.
Douglas clearly reveled in this role. Speaking to a large group of
bankruptcy judges 46 in 1932, he threw clown the gauntlet, saying, "in
the immobility of vested interests I have disrespect; and in the lethargy
and timidity against experimentation I have utter contempt."47 In this
most inhospitable of venues, Douglas vigorously defended a new bankruptcy bill;18 based largely on English bankruptcy law, that would re-

42

!d. at 347·
See id. at 332-33 ("Exemplary of an administrative flexibility, lacking in our system, arc the
following discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of England ... "); Douglas & Marshall,
.wpm note 36, at 35-3 7.
44 This percentage is determined from statistics quoted by Douglas. See Douglas, Some Functional Aspects, supra note 36, at 334· The English approach dates back to r883 and continues to
characterize English bankruptcy law today. For a more recent discussion of England's discretionary discharge, sec Douglas G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (rg82).
4 5 See Douglas, Some Functional Aspects, supra note 36, at 363 - 64 (summarizing proposals for
discretionary discharge). In contrast to his faith that a court or administrator could impose appropriate conditions on a debtor's discharge, Douglas was less sang:1ine about rehabilitation plans
proposed by the debtors themselves. Douglas worried that "wage earners may well be under
pressure of creditors to [propose a rehabilitation plan rather than seek an immediate discharge];
and [debtors'] excessive optimism may well lead to attempts to do so." Douglas, Wage Earner
Bankruptcies, supra note 36, at 63 r. Douglas had previously been sympathetic to wage earner
plans, see Douglas & Marshall, supra note 36, at 49-56 (recommending that wage earner plans be
allowed as long as they were strictly voluntary), but he apparently had become more skeptical by
1933, when Wage Earner Bankruptcies was published.
4 6 Bankruptcy judges were called "referees" until 1973. For simplicity, I will refer to them as
"judges" throughout the essay.
4 7 William 0. Douglas, The Hastings Bill and Lessons Leanzedfrom the Bankruptcy Studies, 7
]. NAT'L ASS'N REF. BANKR. 25, 25 (I932).
4 8 The bill called the "Hastings Bill" - was inspired by the Donovan Report, William ].
Donovan, Report of Counsel to the Petitioners, In re Inquiry into the Administration of Bankrupts' Estates (S.D.N.Y. 1930), reprinted in ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., IN RE
4 .3
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place many of the judicial aspects of U. S. bankruptcy with a more
ad ministrative a pproach .49
D ougl as showed no sympathy whatsoever for b an kruptcy lawyers'
a nd judges' argument that sweeping change would unsettle more than
thirty years of established pr ac tice. H e told the judges :
I cannot agree vvith the philosoph y of the distingui s hed committe e of the
.'\.merican Bar Assoc iation w hen it says that upon the prese nt Bankruptcy
Act ' has bee n builded a great body of judicial dec is io ns w hi ch n1ust no t be
d estroyed or abando ned in faYor of theoretical or untested inn o\·a ti ons .'

[\VJh at co mm e ntary is it o n the legal profess ion that we m ay foi luw our
an cient h a bits with so much unconcern in face of th e ad vanc eme n t o f our
knowledge in recent yea rs? Do, [s ic] we want to treat all bankrup ts a lik e?
A re we no t intere sted in whence th ey com e and whither they are going? 50

D espite Douglas's efforts, the bankruptcy bar ma naged to fend off
the administrative reforms. By the end of r 93 2, the D epression had
deepened, and legislators became more concerned about relief for personal and corporate debtors than about overh a uling th e system altogether. Congress did enact significant legislation, but it merely codified a nd expanded existing practice. 51
Having conducted a painstaking study of individual and small
business bankruptcy, Douglas next turned to the other area of insolvency law - the reorganization of large corporations . In I934, he
wrote an important article arguing for a balance between gove rnmental oversight and priva te negotiation in railroad reorgani zation. 5 2

AD,\IIN1STRAT!ON OF B ANKRUP T ESTATES (193 0), and th e Thacher Report, S. DOC . NO. 72 ~6 5

(1932), which called for sweeping bankruptcy refo rm after in vestigations of exi sting practice.
Douglas participated in th e Donovan and Thacher in vestigatio ns, and bo t h made use of his ban k ~
ruptcy studi es.
49 See Douglas, supra note 47, at 25- 26. In addition to defendin g the proposed s hiit to an au~
ministrative app roach, Douglas suggested an eve n more radi cal ex pe rim ent: "Why no t ab oli sh this
terrifying F ederal beaurocracy [sic] [th at is, the pro posed ad mini strati ve age ncy] and ret u rn the
power [to re gulate bankruptcy] to the state s? " !d. at 27. Douglas defended hi s provocati ve p ro ~
posal to let the states regulate perso nal bankruptcy - a proposal that de se rves far m ore attention
tha n it has bee n given by su bseque nt scholars - at length in an article he pub li shed the same
year. See Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies , supra note 36.
50 Douglas, supra note 47, at 26.
51 Con gress codified railroad receivership and provided for sm a ll debtor an d farmer reh ab ilita~
tion plans in 1933, a nd codi fi ed corporate reo rgani zatio n (that is, receiverships of large, n o n ~
rai lroad firm s) in 1934 . The most important effect of the 1933 and 1934 reform s was to incl ud e
large~scale corpo rate a nd rai lroad re organ ization within th e Bankruptcy Act for th e first time.
For a desc ri ption and political ana lysis of t hese reforms, see Skee l, supra note 30, at 1362-68.
52 S ee Willi am 0. Douglas, Protective Comm itte es in Railmad Reorga nizations, 47 HA RV. L.
REV. 565 (1934). Douglas had a lso conducted a small, ea rli er study of eq ui ty rece ivers hips in
Con ne ctic ut See William 0. Douglas & John H. Wei r, Eq uity R eceiversh ips in the United Sta tes
District Court for Connecticut: I92o- 1929 , 4 CONN. B. J . I (1930). I nterestingly, the firms in
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D ouglas advocated a greater governmental role in policing protective
committee negotiations but rejected an earlier proposal (by another ard en t N ew Dealer) for more sweeping governmental controP 3
I n th e same year, Congress enacted legislation instructing the Securities and E xchange Commission to conduct a study of large corporate
reorganizations. 5 -+ That fall, James Landis contacted Douglas at the
behest of J oseph Kennedy, the first chair of the SEC, and asked
D ouglas if he would come to Washington to conduct the study. 55
D ou glas acc epted, and he spent the next several years overseeing a
massi ve in\·esti ga tion of corporate reorganization practice. \Nith an
equall y 1nonu rnental report, Douglas articulated a distinctively progressive vi sion for large-scale reorganization, later reflected in the legislation tint it. inspired. 56
Douglas's strategy for investigating corporate reorganization echoed the approach of his earlier bankruptcy study in important respects,
but on an even larger scale. Douglas and his principal assistant, Abe
Fortas (a D ouglas protege who would later join Douglas on the Supreme Court), 57 developed an extensive questionnaire to give to the
bankers a nd lawyers involved in every significant restructuring case in
the country. Fortas and other members of the SEC staff, and occasionally Douglas himself, then crisscrossed the country conducting interviews. T hey were appalled by what they found. Because firms' old
managers usually remained in control, and because firms' bankers and
lawyers were allied with them, no one had any incentive to investigate
the possibility that the managers had engaged in fraud or mismanageDouglas's Connecticut study were mid-sized rather than truly large scale, and his study reflected
much less hostility than his subsequent work on corporate reorganization would.
Throughout this period, Douglas had written a series of important articles on corporate and
securities law. S ee, e.g., William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, Some Effects of the Securities
Act upon Investm ent Banking, I U. CHI. L. REV. 283 (I933); William 0. Douglas, A Functional
Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REV. 673 (I929).
53 See I'vla.;: Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, 4 7 HARV. L. REV. IS (I 933).
54 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-29I, § 2II, 48 Stat. 8SI, 909 (codified
at 15 U.SC. § 78 (1994)).
55 See SDION, supra note 19, at I35; James Allen, Introduction, in DOUGLAS, supra note 25,
at x (quoting TIME, Oct. I I, I93 7).
56 The report, SECURITIES AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INV ESTIGATIO N OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE c\I\'D
REORGANIZATION COMl\liTTEES (1936-I940) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] , ultimately grew to
eight volumes. Douglas later speculated that Vern Countryman was the only person outside the
SEC who ever read the entire report. See SIMON, supra note 19, at I49 (noting that even Countryman did not read the report "for bedtime reading but to prepare for his judicial clerkship with
Douglas").
57 As Douglas began the study, Fortas was already working for Douglas's friend Jerome Frank
at the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. As recounted by Douglas's biographer, "[ w ]hat
soon transpired was an extraordinary exchange of letters between Douglas and Frank, in which
Douglas, with an impre5sive combination of audacity, good humor and persistence, wrenched Fortas away from his protesting employer." SIMON, supra note I9, at I4I.
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m ent. 53 M oreover, the vVall Stree t professionals who organized protective committees in order to negotiate the reorganization seemed to fo cus more on obtaining gen erous fe es for themselves than on strikin g a
good bargain on beh alf of the scattered in vestors w hom they purported
to represent. 59 The big losers, of course, we re small, individual in ves tors.60
To remedy these problems, the SEC recommended sweeping
ch a nges. To ensure an objecti ve assessment of management, the SE C
proposed replac in g t he m anagers with a n independent tru stee in every
large reorgani zation case 6 1
T he independent tru stee would be
authorized to run the deb tor's b usiness during th e case and wou ld de velop a propose d reorgani zation plan. To eliminate conflic ts of interest, the SEC propose d to prohibit any banker or lawyer that had a
preexisting relationship with the troubled firm from serv in g eith er as
trustee or as the tru stee's attorn ey.6 2 The proposals also w oul d prohibit the parties fr om solicitin g votes on a proposed reorganization
pl an until after a co urt approved the plan. 63 The overall effec t of
these proposals would be to shift the focus of reorganization to th e in dependent trustee and his professionals, and to usher the central pl ay58

Concerning bankers a nd man age rs, th e report co mplain ed:
Man age ments a nd bankers see k perpetuation of [their] co ntrol for th e business patron age it co mm a nd s, wh ich t hey may ta ke for the mse lves o r a ll ot to others, a s they w ill.
They see k, a lso, to perpetuate that control in order to stifle careful scrutiny of the p ast
history of t he co rporati on. There by, clai ms base d on fr a ud or misman agem ent a re still ed

!d. a t 863
59 Concerning reorgani zatio n lawyers, th e report stated:
[C]o un se l fees freq uentl y consti t ute the largest sin gle item on t he li st of reorgani zati on
The vice is that th e bar has been charging a ll that th e traffic wi ll bea r. It has
fees. .
forsaken the tradition tha t its me mb ers a re office rs of th e court a nd shou ld req uest and
ex pec t o nly modest fees.
r SEC REPORT, supra note s6, at S6 i.
60 Progressive sc holars had be en raisin g these complain ts for years by th e time Do uglas and
hi s sta ff completed th e SEC Report. Mos t p romine ntly, Max Lowe nthal wro te a book- lengt h
expose of the reorganization of the C hicago, Mi lw a ukee & St. Paul Rai lroad (the ''St. Paul ") that
d ecried th e domin ation of the process by the Wall Street ba nkers and bar.
See l'vl.-\X
L OWENTHAL, THE I NVESTOR PAYS (1933). Intere stingly, Douglas him se lf had worked exte nsively on th e St. P aul case duri ng hi s brief career as a practic ing lawyer at C ravat h, Swaine &
Moore . S ee SIMON, supra note 19 , at 84- 85 .
61 The mandatory tr ustee requireme nt was by far the most co nt roversial of the SEC proposa ls.
F or a more detailed discussion of the proposals and the le gislative hi story, see David A. Skee l, Jr.,
The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Ba nkruptcy (Nov. 9, 1999) (unp ublished manu script, on fil e wit h
the a u thor).
62 Under the SEC proposals (and, after t heir enactment in t he Chandl er Act amendm e nts of
r 938, under the Bankruptcy Act) , both the trustee and the trustee's attorney were required to be
"di sin te re sted. " Amendments to th e Bankru ptcy Act of r8g8, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. SiS,§ 156,
5 2 Stat. 840, 888 (trustee ); id. at§ 157 , 52 Stat. at 888 (trustee's attorney). "Disinte res ted " was
defined explicitly to exclude a ny un derwriter of oulstandin g securiti es, and any attorney for the
debto r or its banks. See id. a t § rs8, 52 Stat. at 888.
63 See id. at§ q 6, 52 Stat. at 891.
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ers under existing law - managers, Wall Street bankers, and Vvall
Street lawyers - out of the reorganization process altogether. For the
d eb tors ' managers and their professionals, filin g for bankruptcy would
m ean turning over the keys to the SEC, the court, and a trustee.
As with the general bankruptcy bar in his earlier study, Douglas
did not hesitate to attack the reorganizatio n bar (and by implicati on,
Cravath , his former employer and the leading reorganization firm ):
The prominence of th e lawyer extends down to the close of reorgan izat ion
and includes the negotiati on and co nsumm ation of a plan of reorganization.
[A]t times the client has abdicate d , so to speak , ka1:ing the lawyer in
so le command. . . . [T]hcre has been a degeneration of the bar in thes e situations. Co nflicts of interest hav e h ad their corrod in g intluence 6 -l

Abe Fortas's account to Douglas of a visit lo Fortas's Yale Law
School reorganization class by Robert Swaine of Cravath, the nation's
m ost prominent reorganization lawye r, illu strates the depth of the hostility that the SEC report aroused. "Approximately an hour and a half
was taken up with a defense of himself and an attack of Part I of our
report," Fortas reported . "[Swaine] assured the boys that Part I design a ted him as a liar and a perjurer; he pointed out th e many sections in
which, according to his interpretation, he was accused of avarice. He
entered a most vigorous denial to all the charges." 65
As in his work on small bankruptcies, Dou glas insisted on the need
for experimentation and sweeping change. Once again , his emphasis
was on the importance of the individual: this time, the small investors
in large, troubled firms. Only by displacing a debtor 's managers with
an independent trustee, and wresting control of reorganization away
from Wall Street, could investors' interests be truly protected. In the
middle of the New Deal, with the weight of the SEC behind him and
populist antagonism toward Wall Street professionals at high tide,
Douglas was perfectly positioned to convert the SEC experiment in investor protection into federal law. 66 In r 93 7, th e SEC injected its proposals into bankruptcy legislation that had been pending in Congress

64 DOUGLAS, supra note 25, at 233. During the SEC in vestigatio n, Douglas interrogated a ll of
the most prominent reorganization lawye rs. In his often apocryphal a utobiog rap hy, Douglas
claimed th a t after he finished deposing Robert Swaine, his former boss at Cravath , Swai ne marveled that Douglas "stood me on my head and shook a ll of the fillings out of my teeth."
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, GO EAST YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 260 (1974) [hereinafte r,
DOUGLAS, Go EAST].
65 Letter from Abe Fortas to Willi am 0 . Douglas (May 20, 193 7) (on fi le w ith the Library of
Congress, Douglas Papers, Container N o. 6).
66 By late 193 7 Douglas had become C hairman of the SEC and had lau nched a stunningly
successful effort to reorganize the New York Stock Exchange to better serve investors' in terests.
H e a lso had become a close advisor to President Roosevelt by this time. See SIMON, supra note
r 9, at r68-7 5. These deve lopments obviously did not hu rt hi s infl ue nce in t he bankruptcy reform
process.
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for several years . Congress subsequently enacted the proposals, almost
\·erbatim, as Chap te r X of the Ch a ndler Act of 1938 .67
To put "W illiam Dougl as's bankruptcy legacy into broader context,
it is important to note that other prominent sc hol ars had differing perspectives regarding w hat a progress ive bankruptcy framevvork sh ould
look like. For personal and small business ba nkruptcy, several of
Douglas 's colle agues at Yale proposed different and arg uably more
d r <~.rrBtic , t hough related , reform s. Most in triguing was \Vesle_y Sturges's call to revamp t he commercial law priority fr a mewo rk. Und er
S:.turges 's proposal, ea rlier cred itors wo uld take pri ority over subsey:..:c::1t ones, so that a subse quent cre di to r ran the ris k of be ing left \Vi th
'lO t.h ing if it lent to an overburdened de btor. 6 3
.
• 1ars c["rviacu
. I ' a j ong tile
u n corporate oan k·ruptcy, progress rve
scl1o
sam e lines as did New Deal theorists in a famous economi c de bate
during th e Roosevelt Administration. 69 Advocates of "competition "
like Loui s B randeis w a nted to destroy big business in order to protect
local entrepreneurs; they favored Main Street over Wall Street. 70 The
"pla nners," by contrast, led by Rexford Tugwell and Adolf Berle of
Roosevel t 's "brain trust," argued that the con solidation of business ar,d
the growth of the giant corporations were inevitable. Rather than
fragmenting business, therefore, the planners wanted to subj ect it to
pervasive gove rnmental control.' 1
Douglas shared Bra ndeis's emphasis on competition and individual
initiati ve, a nd was sometimes chided by "planners " such as Je rome
Fr a nk fo r not advocating greater governmental oversight. 72 D ouglas's
''

1

1

6; :\ct of J une 22 , 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by P ub. L No. 95-598 . 92 Stat. 25 ,19,
26S2 II 9iSl . P ri or to the SEC's in volve m ent, the Chandler Bill had co nsisted of extensive
changes proposed by the National Bankru p tcy Confere nce (NBC), a n organization that in clud ed
th e icacling me mbe rs of the ba nkru ptcy bar. The SEC dramati cally interve ned in late H)36, proposin g an e ntire ly new set of provisio ns fo r the reorganization of large corporatio ns. The C han dl er t\ct reflected a te nse a lli ance betwee n the SE C and the NBC, with the SEC dictating the
te rm s of la rge co rporate reo rganizations ("C hapter X") and the NBC influencin g the re mainder of
th e ,-\ct. Fo r a more detail ed disc ussion, see Skeel, supra note 30, at 1368-72.
6S S ee We sley A. Sturges, A Proposed State Collection Act, 43 Yc\LE L.]. ross (1934): Wesley
A. St ur ges & Don E. Cooper, Credit Administration and Wag e Earner Ba nkruptci es , 4 2 YALE
L.]. -t87 (1 933). Althou g h he t houg ht th a t Sturges's proposal had limi ta tio ns, Ve rn Co un trym a n
later di sc usse d it with ob vious a pproval. See Vern Co untry man , Improvident C1·edit Extension: A
N ew L egai Co ncept .1boming?, 27 ME. L. REV. r , 6-8 (1975).
69 F or a good ove rvi ew of th is debate, see ARTH UR M. SCHLESINGER, JR ., THE CRJ SIS OF
TilE OLD ORDER: 19 ! 9-1 933, at 398- 405 (1957).
i O Brandei s 's vi ews were best known from his famous book excoriating th e ''Money Tr ust ' '
LOUIS D . BRA:'-J DEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 5 (I9f4).
il See SCHLE SI NG ER, sup ra no te 69, at 399-405.
i2 Com menti ng o n D ouglas's s uggestio n in his railroad reorgani zation arti cle that t he parti es
rath er th a n a governmen t agen cy should develop th e term s of reorganizati on , F rank responded:
I am not thoro ughly co n vin ced that the tec hnique yo u advocate is the bes t one . If t he
[I nte rstate C om merce] Co mmi ssion has too m any du tie s to per mit it to undertake, on its
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SEC proposals called for much more aggressive reform than he had
advocated earlier, and can be seen as responding in part to these criticisms. Yet as radical as the SEC proposals were, they nevertheless assumed that private parties (principally the independent trustee) would
run the reorganization process. Douglas's vision for progressive reform meant breaking the grip of the Wall Street bankers and lavvyers
and protecting investors - not direct governmental control.
Even after joining the Supreme Court in I 939, Dou glas pursued his
progressive approach to bankruptcy. In two early opinions, Douglas
held that the Chandler Act and the ccrporate reorganization provision
it replaced prohibi te d confirmation of a reorganization plan unless it
complied with the absolute priority rule. 73 Under the absolute priority
rule, lower priority creditors and stockholders cannot receive anything
in a reorganization unless senior creditors are paid in full.' 4 W hereas
the reorganization bar had long insisted that flexible priority rules
were essential to the reorganization process/ 5 Douglas and other progressive scholars believed that strict enforcement of the parties' priorities provided crucial protection for junior creditors. 76 Absent absolute
priority, senior creditors and shareholders could enter into collusive arrangements that preserved an interest for shareholders at the expense
of junior creditors. 77 By construing ambiguous language that appeared both in the I 938 Chandler Act amendments and in prior law as

own, the formation of a Plan, then it seems to me some agency or agencies should be set
up with all the powers that you advocate.
Letter from Jerome Frank to William 0. Douglas (Jan. 19, 1934) (on file with the Library of Congress, Douglas Papers, Container No.6).
73 See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. sro, 527 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. ro6, r 19 (1939).
74 For a detailed discussion of the absolute priority rule and its history, highlighting the roles
of Douglas, Jerome Frank, and Robert Swaine, see Douglas Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost (Dec. ro, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Harvard Law Review).
75 See Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last
Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 911-23 (1927). Among other things, flexible priority rules,
which became known as "relative priority," permitted shareholders to participate rather than have
their interests cut off in favor of higher priority creditors. Shareholders often were an important
source of new capital, and because the firm's managers often held stock, relative priority also gave
them an incentive to facilitate the reorganization process rather than to resist it.
76 See Frank, Some Realistic Reflections, supra note rS, at 566-69.
77 The collusion could take a variety of forms. Senior creditors might agree to a restructuring
pursuant to which the old shareholders acquire the firm at the foreclosure sale in return for a cash
contribution, but junior creditors receive neither the right to contribute nor any payment. The
risk to junior creditors was magnified by the artificial nature of the sale. Because outside bidders
rarely appeared, managers and senior creditors had significant flexibility in valuing the firm's
assets. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 14-17; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections, supra
note rS, at 553-55·
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adop ting a firm commitment to absolute priority/ 8 Douglas reinforced
the progressive vision of corporate reorganization that Congress had
enac ted in 1938. 7 9
B. Progressive Bankruptcy Th eory Today: Elizabeth Warren

Sixty ye ars after Douglas joined t he Supreme Court, scholars continu e to debate man y of the same iss ues th a t preoccupied him and
other progressives in th e r 930s. Foremost among the current progressives is E lizabeth Warre n. L ike Douglas, Warren decries the dearth of
emp irical data and insists on the need both to fill this gap an d to usc
empirical work to inform a n age nda for constructive change. In words
that ec ho Douglas's approac h, she proclaims that "a debate without
data is a useless exc ursion, a trip from nowhere to nowhere."80 As
simil a r as Warren 's commitme nts are to those of Douglas and the early
p rogressives, they also di ffer in intrigu in g respects.8 1
E lizabeth Warren is best know n for an extensive study of personal
bankruptcy that she conducted with Theresa Sullivan and Jay Westbrook, which led to their 1989 book As We Forgive Our Debtors. 82
Since William Douglas's landmark investigation of small business and
personal bankruptcy in the I9JOS, there had been only a few largescale empirical efforts to investigate personal bankruptcy. The most
influential of these was a Brookings Institute study that figured
prominently in the debates that led to the I9i8 Bankruptcy Code. 83
Warren and her co-authors embarked on an even more extensive study,
in their words "the largest study of consumer debtors undertaken in

78 The amendments required that a reorganization plan be "fair and eq uitable. " Chandler Act
of 1938 , ch. 575, § 221(2), 52 Stat. 840, 89 7 (codified as amend ed at r r U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1994)).
Douglas treated this language as a shorthand reference to th e a bsolute priority rule.
79 The progressives were not the only sc holars writing abo ut bankruptcy law, of course. Other
sc hola rs, the most prominent of whom was James McLaughlin of H arvard, wrote in the d octrina list tradition . Along wit h a small gro up of bank ruptcy lawye rs a nd acade mics, McLau g hlin
helped to found t he National Bankru ptcy Co nfere nce in 1932. He was the leading doctrin a l
scholar, a nd a fi xture at co ngressional hearin gs on bankruptcy from the 1920s to the 196os. For
a n illustra ti ve early a rti cle, see J a mes A. Mc Laug hlin , Amendment of th e Bankruptc y Act , 40
HARV. L. REV. 341 (1927). Al tho ugh th e interests of these sc holars a nd Douglas 's SEC intersected briefly in their combined efforts to promote bankru p tcy re form in 1938, the progressives
a nd doctrina lists otherwise had li ttle in co mmon. The doctrina lists were traditional and conservati ve, w hereas the progressives too k a passio nate interest in expe rim entation and change .
so Elizabeth Warren & J ay Lawrence Westbrook, S earching for R eorganization Realities, 72
W ASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1258 (1994).
81 In addition to the di stin ctio ns that I note in the text, Wa rre n can be see n as populist in orientatio n, whereas Douglas's views have more in common with the P rogressive movement.
82 TERESA A. SULLIVA N, ELIZABETH W ARRE N & J AY L AW RE NCE WESTBROOK, AS WE
FORGIVE O UR D EBTORS: B AN KRU PTCY AND CO NSUMER CREDIT IN Al\IE RICA (1989).
83 D AV ID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRT H, BA NKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (197 1).
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the U nited States."84 Based on the inform ation th at debtors must provid e vvhen they file for bankruptcy, Warren and her co-authors studied
a total of 1,547 cases filed in rg8r in ten di stricts scattered throughout
Texas, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. 85
In As lVe Forgive Our Debtors, Sullivan, \Varren, and ·westbrook
prov ide a detailed profile of U.S. bankruptcy d ebtors an d their finan cial condition when they filed for bankruptcy. Some of the autho rs'
findings are unsurprising: for example, individual s who file for bankru ptcy in thi s country tend to have more debt a nd less incom e than
those who do not. 86 Less obvio us is the study's findin g that debto rs do
not com e disproportionately from low-pay, lo\v-prestige occ up a tions .
To the contrary, d ebtors look much like everyone else, suggestin g that
layoffs or other job disruptions may be the princip a l reason for their
mu ch lovver income.8 7
Throughout their analysis, Warren and her co-authors pay particular attention to issues involving debtors ' decisions whether to seek
an immediate discharge under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or to
propose a three- to five-year rehabilitation plan under Chapter 13. 88
Comme ntators and creditor groups have long contended that too few
debtors choose the rehabilitation option. Many debtors who obtain
immediate discharge, they argue, could pay their creditors more if they
proposed a rehabilitation plan instead. Creditor groups have argued
vehemently since the rg6os that debtors who are capable of repaying
some of their debt over time should be forced into Chapter r 3. 89
In As We Forgive Our Debtors and elsewhere, Warren sharply criticizes the credit industry 's proposals for steering more debtors into
Chapter 13. Warren and her co-authors point out that a substantial
percentage of debtors who do embark on repayment plan s are unable
to complete them. 90 Although a prominent study sponsored in part by
84 SULLIVAN , WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82, a t q. F or a detailed de scription of
th e study and its method ology, see id. at 17-1 9. Unlike Douglas, Warre n and her co-authors relied for their study on filing data rath er than on interviews with deutors.
ss See id. at q-18.
86 See id. at 65 .
87 See id. at 84-105
SS See id. a t 208. Congress added the second option, which was traditionally kn own as a
"w age earner p lan," in 1938. For a description of this deve lopment, see H.R. REP . .:\0. 75-1409,
at 52 - 55 (1937). Althou gh this approach delays a debtor 's di scharge , lawmakers be lieved it wo uld
red uce the stigma of bankruptcy. If debtors committed to co ntinue paying for seve ral m ore years,
lawmakers reaso ned, th ey and their credi tors would be less likel y to vie w bankruptcy as aband onin g their obli gation s. To reinforce this perception, deb tors wh o sought a n immedi ate discharge were referred to as "bankrupts" until 1978 , whereas t hose w ho proposed a rehabili tation
plan were called "de btors."
89 Fo r a brief, condemnatory overview of the creditor gro ups' position, see Vern Count ry man,
Bankmptcy and the In dividual Debtor - And a Mod est Proposal to R et um to the S e-uenteenth
Centm·y, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 821 -26 (1983).
90 See SULLIVAN , W ARR EN & W ES TBROOK, supra note 82, at 220-23 .
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the credit industry concluded that Ch apter 7 debtors could pay off
more th an four billion dollars of debt if they used Chapter r3, Warre n
and her co-authors dismiss the findings as unreliable. 9 1
\Var ren and her co-authors are simil a rly skeptical of claims that
deb tors co uld be encouraged to choose the repayment alternative
rather than immediate discharge if lawmakers made adjustments such
as redu cin g debtors' exemptions. 92 In both her co-auth ored and solo
work, Warren rej ects the suggestion that debtors will respond in a
simple. predictable way to ch anges in the bankruptcy law s. "This
prem ise [that reducing exemptions will cause more debto rs to choose
C hapter r3] ," she argues, "calls to mind thousands of almost-b ank rup t
rational maximizers sittin g anxiously on some hypo theti cal cost/be nefit
cur ve, waiting for the numbers to come down from Congress."93 Th e
reality is much more complex and, in fact, existing d ata cast serious
doubt on the contention that exemptions can be used to shape debtor
behavior. 94
As t hi s overview suggests, the policy proposals of As We Forgive
Our D eb tors are principally negative in form: lawmakers should preserve th e current framework and protect debtors rather than accede to
creditors' cries for reform. 95
9! In a n earli er a rti cle, Warren and he r co-a uthors subj ecte d the study {kn ow n as the "Purdue
St udy," b ased on the uni ve rsity affiliation of its authors) to withering sc rutiny. See Teresa A. Sulli van, Eli zabeth Warre n & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Limiting Access to B ank ruptcy Discharge.·
An Ana lysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV . 1091. Th ey conclud ed:
The Study lacks crucial expe rti se, is designed in co rrect ly, as ks a series o f inartful question s, gathers its data imprope rly, mi sanalyses th e statistical data and draws erroneous
and biased infe rences from th e data a nalysis. M oreover, error after e rr or increases the
co unt of the d ebtors w ho "co uld pay" a nd the amou nt of th e deb t that co uld be recovered
!d. at r 145 .
92 Th e t heo ry was that if Con gress dimini shed deb tors ' exemptions, debto rs would be unabl e
to p rotect the ir property a nd sti ll receive an imm ed iate discharge . If th e exemptions were too
sm a ll to protect important property, and debtors wanted to kee p t he property, they wo uld need to
fil e under C hapter 13. In Chapter 13, deb tors co uld propose a rehab ilitati on plan that pro mised
on go ing paym e nts to creditors whil e permitting the debtors to keep their prop e rty. In C hap ter 7,
on th e other hand , non exe mp t property would be sold and the proceeds di stributed to cred itors.
For a ge neral di scussion of exemptions, see p. 1082.
9.3 Eli zabeth Warren , Reducing Bankruptcy Prot ection for Consumers: A Response, 72 CEO.
L.J. 1333, 1343 (!984),
9 4 See id. at 1344-45 (citin g evid ence that a di sp roportion ate percentage o f debtors in Te xas
c hoose Chapter 13 , d espite hi gh exe mpti ons, a nd t hat lowe r exemptions d o not d ec rease bankruptcy filin gs); see als o SULLIVAN, WARR EN & WE STBROO K, supra note 82, at 19-20 (suggestin g that th e a ut hors' data cast doubt on the ass umpti on in the 1984 amendments to the Bankrup tcy Code that altering the statu te wo uld influ ence debto rs ' filing decisions).
95 See SU LLIVA N, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82, at 339-41 (sum marizin g co nclusio n s) . Warren and her co-authors have revisited their findings in a new study. Their preliminary
a nal ysis confirms the ge neral conc lu sio ns of As We Forgive Our Debtors. See Te resa A . S ullivan,
E li zabeth Warre n & J ay Law re nce Westbrook, Consumn Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial
CompaYison of Consumer Bankrupts I98I -I99 I , 68 AM. BA N KR. L.J . r2r, 125 (1994).
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vVarren 's work on personal bankruptcy marks her as an obvious intellectual heir of William Douglas, yet it also reveals subtle differences.
As noted above, the most obvious kinship between Douglas and Warren lies in their shared commitment to empirics. Both insist that reform must be grounded in careful attention to empirical data. vVhen
Warren emphasizes (in another context) that her policy analysis "takes
its cue from the tradition of legal realism, asserting that real-world
constraints necessarily - and properly - bind bankruptcy policy, and
that only in a specified factual context does a policy discussion become
meaningful," 96 it is hare! not to think of William Douglas. Yet V!arren
is far less sympathetic than Douglas to using the law instrumentally,
especially when the aim is to shape debtors' behavior.
The question whether debtors should receive an immediate discharge nicely illustrates these similarities and differences between
·warren's and Douglas's work on personal bankruptcy. Douglas criticized the immediate discharge, and contended that courts should be
permitted to postpone or condition the cancellation of a debtor's obligations. Both Douglas's urge to experiment and his interest in molding debtor behavior stand in contrast to Warren's reluctance to tinker
with the bankruptcy discharge.
Like Douglas in the I 930s, Warren turned her attention to debates
about corporate reorganization after writing As We Forgive Our Debtors, although she has continued to devote considerable energy to personal bankruptcy issues. Douglas was thrown headlong into corporate
reorganization by Congress's call for the SEC to investigate reorganization practice. For Warren, as for other recent bankruptcy scholars,
the pivotal event was the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
The Bankruptcy Act had imposed rigid requirements on the reorganization of large, publicly held corporations. 97 In addition to the mandatory trustee requirement and the exclusion of a debtor's bankers and
attorneys, the chapter for large debtors also required strict compliance
with the absolute priority rule. 98 As noted earlier, both can be traced
to William Douglas: Chapter X explicitly required an inde pendent
trustee, and Douglas authored the two Supreme Court decisions holding that the "fair and equitable" standard, which was a requirement
for reorganization under both Chapter X and prior law, incorporated
the a bsolute priority rule. 99 These requirements made bankruptcy an
extraordinarily undesirable prospect for the managers and sharehold-

96 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336,
3 78 ( 1 993) (focusing on corporate bankruptcy).
97 As described above, the drafter and principal advocate for these provisions was William
Douglas himself. See supm pp. 1088-9r.
98 See supm p. 1092.
99 See id.
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ers of a troubled firm , because their interests would be wiped om 111
bankruptcy. 100
The 1978 Code brought dramatic change to corporate reorganization . Chapter r I, the Code's new corporate reorganization provisions ,
assumed that the firm's managers (not an independent trustee) would
continue to run the firm in bankruptcy and gave the managers the e:~
clusive right to propose a reorganization plan for at least the first four
rnonths of the reorganizalion. 101 Chapter I r also significantly re-·
trenched from the absolute priority ru le: t he rule would not ap ply to
any class of creditors or shareholders ,-v ho voted in favor of the pro-·
posed p1an. 102 These changes made bankruptcy much more attracti""'='
for large , troubled corporations and, by the late I g8os and early I ggos,
an un precede n ted number of prominent firms had file d for bankruptcy
in response to failed leveraged buyouts and other problems. 103 In
1983, Continental Airl ines filed for Chapter II and used bankruptcy to
renegotiate its collective bargaining agreement with employees. 104
Federated Department Stores filed for bankruptcy after a disastrous
leveraged buyout, and both Johns Manville and A.H. Robins invoked
Chapter r I in the face of mushrooming tort liability. 105
The new popularity of bankruptcy in the executive suite proved
controversial. Although some observers cheered these developments,
others leveled a variety of complaints. Critics asserted both that managers were strategically using bankruptcy as a tool for addressing
business concerns even in the absence of true financial distress 106 and
that Chapter I I proceedings could be extraordinarily costly and timeconsuming for those with firms that did belong in bankruptcy. The
only winners in many cases seemed to be bankruptcy lawyers and
other professionals who charged by the hour. 107

100 To avoid these strictures, an increasing number of large firms attempted to file for bankruptcy under Chapter XI, the provisions designed for smaller debtors. The SEC tried, but ultimately failed, to prevent this practice. For a discussion and political explanation of the demise of
the SEC in bankruptcy, see Skeel, supm note 6r.
101 See II u_s_c. § II07 (I994) (vesting authority in "debtor in possession"); II u_s_c. § II2I
(I994) (providing a 120-day exclusivity period)_
102 See II u_s_c. § II29(b) (1994) (applying the absolute priority rule only if the class dissents).
103 See KEVIN H. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: HOW CORPORATIONS AND
THEIR CREDITORS USE CHAPTER I I TO THEIR ADVANTAGE 2-3 (Iggz)_
104 See id. at I-2.
105 See id. at 3·
106 See, e.g., RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON
SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 337, 339-40 (rggr) (describing and criticizing the treatment of Dalkon
Shield victims in the A.H. Robins bankruptcy).
107 For a scathing account of this process- and the burden of lawyers' fees and other costsby the manager of a firm that filed for bankruptcy, see SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS
(Ig8g).
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Whatever the merits of these complaints, they are closely linked to
th e changes effected by the r g 78 Code . Leaving managers in charge
and relaxing the absolute p riority rule have given the managers of
large corporate debtors much more flexibility than they had in the
past. This flexibility and the managers' exclusive right to propose a
plan are t he most obviou s explanations for the prolonged duration of
Chapter I I cases. 1 0 s
In a I 992 article, Michael B radley and Michael Rosenzvveig sharply
criticize managers' role in corporate reorganization and cali for a comple te revision of the Chapter I I regime. 109 :u ased on z;n extensive
analysis of the securities prices of firms that wound up in bankruptcy,
Bradley and Rosenzweig suggest that firms fare fa r worst under Chapter r I than they would have under the prior Bankruptcy Act. 110 They
argue that Congress shou ld replace Chapter I I wi th a stock cancellation regime that simply eliminates shareholders' interes t in t he event
the firm defaults on its obligations. In place of the flex ible approach
of Chap ter I I, their proposal would enforce a severe version of absolute priority. 111
If the views of William Douglas and the early bankruptcy progressives could simply be plugged into these debates about corporate reorganization, then we might expect current progressives to have agreed
with at least some aspects of the Bradley and Rosenzweig analysis.
The B radley and Rosenzweig article sharply criticizes managers and
strongly favors strict absolute priority and was viewed by the corporate bankruptcy bar as a direct assault on existing practice. 112 William
Douglas, of course, too k precisely the same stance on eac h of these issues. Yet bankruptcy progressives uniformly have condemned the
Bradley and Rosenzweig analysis, as evidenced most prominently in
an attack by Elizabeth Warren, who sharply criticized the empirical
analysis of the controversial article and has defended Chapter I I . 11 3

108
109

See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Troub le w ith Chapto· II , I 993 \VIS. L. REV. 729, 747-49.
See Michael Bradley & Michael Rose nzweig, The Untenable Case f01· ChapteY I I , IOI YALE

L.J. I043 (I 992).
IIO See id. at 1049 , I067-72.
III See id. at 1050, 1078-88. In the wake of the Bradley and Ro senzweig article, law and economics sc holars proposed a variety of other alternatives to Chapter I I. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler,
Financial and Political Th eories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 3II, 3I2,
323- 33 (I993) (arguing for a stoc k cance llatio n proposal similar to Bradley's and Rosenzweig's
p rop osal); Robert K. Rasmusse n, Debto1·'s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corpora te Bankruptcy, 7 I
TEX. L. REV. 5 I, I00-2 I (I992) (proposing a "menu" approach allowi ng debtors to select from a
variety of bankruptcy options).
11 2 See Wade Lambert & Milo Geyelin, Bankruptcy Lawyers Dispute Call for Saapping Chapter I I Proc ess, WALL ST. J., Mar. IQ, 1992, at Bs.
113 See Elizabet h Warren, Th e Untenabie Cas e for Repeal of Chaptn· I I , I02 YALE L.J. 437,
439- 79 (I992). Lynn LoPucki was equally dismissive. See Lynn !VI. LoPucki, Stmnge Visions in a
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Al thou gh earlier progressives would have a greed w ith m uch of
\Varren 's critiq ue - n amely, her concerns abo u t the d ata a nd t he limited re al-world grounding of the proposed refo rm - it is usefu l to
elaborate on their differences, which reflect th e chan ges in progressive
thin ki n g. In her response to B radley a n d R osenzw eig, and elsew here,
VVarr en >.v o rries much less th an D ouglas did th at managers wi ll use
ban ktup tcy to the detriment of oth er pa rt ies. Sh e a n d other p rogresSlves
cases such as Continental, in '.vhich ma n a ge rs inv oke Chapter r I to achieve particular objectives , as bank ru ptcy successes, not
fai l ur es . 1 1 ~
Similarly, Warren h as a great deal of sym p athy for the
flex ibil i of Chapter I r and its relaxed treatrne nt of the a bsolute priority ru le. L ik e D ou glas , Warren cares d ee ply about d istribution al issues - -,vho wins a nd -vvho loses in bankru ptcy. O ne of h er most frequent criticism s of law-and-economics-b ased b ankr uptcy scholarship is
that it igno res distrib utional effects. 11 5 Ye t sh e has a very different v ision for achieving distributional fairness. Whereas Douglas insisted on
disp lacing managers and strictly adhering to t he absolute priority rule ,
Warren suggests that leaving managers in place and providing a more
flexible bankruptcy process are essential to achieving bankruptcy's distributional goals. In her most detailed analysis of the functions of
business bankruptcy, for instance, Warren emphasizes the virtues of
giving managers a sta ke in the bankruptcy decision and encouraging
reorganization to preserve the going concern value of a troubled
firm. 116
\tVarren 's enthusiasm for the current Chapter I I regime also reflects
a remarka bly different stance toward the cor porate reorganization bar
than the one taken by D ouglas in the r 930s. As we saw earlier,
D ouglas vigorously attacked the bar of his day- bankruptcy lawyers
were the target of much of his criticism of existing practice. 117 By conStmnge Wm·ld: A Reply to PYojesson Bradley and Rosenzwt:ig, 9I MICH. L. REV. 79, 8I-I ro
(1992).
11 4 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankmptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 787 (I987) (listing Continental as one of "a host of ... bankruptcy success stories"). Although \Varren acknowledges
critics' concerns about Chapter I I, she argues that outcomes would be far worse in the absence of
the reorganiz a tion provisions. See Elizabeth vVarren, Bankruptcy Is a Better Altemati·ue, NAT 'L
L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at IS [hereinafter, Warren, BetleY AlteYnative].
115 In an exchange with law and economics scholar Douglas Baird, Warren repeatedly criticized
Baird 's effort to bracket distributional considerations: "Baird cannot assert that he is offering no
distributional scheme . .
Any scheme distributes, whether Baird chooses to discuss it or not."
Warren, Bankmptcy Policy, supra note I 14, at 8oS.
116 Warren argues that the bankruptcy system as a whole is de signed to address four separate,
though interrelated, goals: maximizing the value of the troubled firm, distributing value (by taking distributional concerns into account), internalizing the costs of failure, and encouraging debtors and their managers to initiate bankruptcy, rather than relying on governmental officials to do
so. See vVarren, supm note g6, at 344-73. In Warren's view, the more manager-friendly confines
of Chapter I I advance both the first and fourth of these goals. See id. at 372.
117 See supm pp. ro87, rogo.
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trast, the views of Warren a nd ot her current progressives sound surp ri s ing!~:/ simil ar to those of th e lawyers w hom D ouglas w as busy assailing. In a I 92 7 article on prioriti es in bankruptcy, for instance,
bankruptcy lawyer Robe rt Swaine defended relaxed p riority r ul es as
essential to promotin g reo rganization. 1 18 Niore rec ent bank ru ptcy pr ogressives share Sw aine's assum ption th at reorganization must be encouraged , despi te the attack on this positi on by their predecess or
D ougl as.
Not surp risingly, these vie'vv s h av e endeared bankru ptcy p rogres··
sives to the current corporate reorganization bar.11 9 It is difficu lt to
imagine the m embers of the >Jational Ban kr u ptcy Confe rence im·itir:g
William Douglas to join thern in the I 93 0s, as they did Elizabeth 'War··
ren in the early r ggos . By a ll accoun ts , 'Warren has become an enormou sly influenti al m ember of the Conference, -vv hich has lon g been th e
bankruptcy bar 's most prominent reform and lo bbying organiz atio n. 1 2 0
I n 1995, Warre n was ap p ointed chi ef advisor to the newly formed
N ational Bankru ptcy Review Commission. 121 For the next two years,
she led the Commission in the m ost thorough assessment of U. S. bankruptcy law in twe nty years. The Commission's proposals reflec t man y
of the progressive views that I discuss above. In the context of personal bankruptcy, the Commission strongly endorsed d ebtors ' a ccess to
an immediate discharge, and rejected calls by creditors for means
testing provisions that would for ce debtors to use Chapter 13 if they
were able to rep ay some of their debts. 122 In an effort to preempt the
S ee Swaine, supm note 7 5, at 90 7.
Other prominent p rogre ss ive s, such as Lynn L oPucki and Karen Gross, have a lso establi s hed (or maintained) c lose ti es to th e bankru ptcy bar.
120 Warre n has se rve d as a me m ber o f the exec uti ve committee a nd as a c hai r of th e new me m be rs committee . S ee E-M ail Cor respondence from Profess or D o uglas Baird, Uni ve rsity o f C hicago Law School, to D a vid Skeel (Fe b. 9, 2000 ) (on fil e with the au thor); se e also Teleph o ne fnter·
v iew with Ge ra ld Smi t h, Lewi s & R oca , Ph oe nix , Ari z. (Fe b. 8, 2000) (noting W a rren' s influ e nce ).
121 D epe nding on how one co un ts (and w ha t one in cludes), thi s Commissio n, whi c h iss ued its
re port in O ctober 199 7, was the fo urth m aj or governme nta l study of bankrup tcy in t his ce ntu ry.
Th e four studies are: r) the Don ova n and Th ac her reports of th e early I9J OS, which inv estigated
a buses in ba nkruptcy a dmini st ration , see supm note 48 ; 2) the SE C "protective commi ttee" st udy
headed by William Doug las, see supm pp . ro88- 89; 3) a report by t he Nati onal B a nk rup tcy
Co mmission o f 197 3, whi ch proposed the swee ping ove rhaul of U. S. bankrup tcy law t ha t even t ually led to the enactment of th e 1978 Code, see COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAW S OF TH F:
UNITED STATES, R EPORT , H .R . Doc. NO. 93-137 , (1973) (h e reinafte r 19 73 C 0:'-1MISS IO N
REPORT] ; a nd 4) a repo rt by th e National Ba nkruptcy Review Commissio n o f 199 7, see N AT ' L
B ANKR. R EVIEW C OMM'N, BAN KRUPT CY: THE NEXT TWE NTY YEARS (1997), ava ilable at
National Bankmpt cy R ev iew Commission (visited Jan . 2 4, 2000) <http://www.nbrc. go v/reportco nt.html> (h ereinafte r 1997 C OMMISSIO N R E PORT].
122 S ee 1997 COM:VIISSIO N R EPORT , supra note 12 1, ch. r , at 89- 91 (c riti cizin g " means testin g"
pr oposals that would require m ore debtors to use Cha pte r 13 an d concluding that th e Co mmi ssion's "proposals conte mplate no cha nge in th e basic stru cture of co nsumer b a nkruptc y "). \Varren
ex plains t he Commission 's views a nd defends the imm ediate di sc ha rge a gain s t cri tic ism by t he
co ns umer credi t industry in several ar ticl es p ubli shed sin ce the 1997 Commissio n R e port w as re11 8
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1997 Commission proposals, the consumer credit industry introduced
le gislation that had considerable support in Congress last fall and is
currently pending. Warren has served as an informal advisor to Hillary Clinton, 123 and has actively campaigned against this legislation.
In business bankruptcy, t he C ommission worked closely with the
bankruptcy bar and proposed to preserve and in several respects to
expand the cu rrent framework . The Commi ssion 's deliberations on
"prepackaged bankruptcies" are illustrati ve . In a prepac kaged bankrup tcy, a troubled fi rm's managers solicit support for a reorganization
proposal before they file for bankruptcy. They then submit the firm' s
proposed reorganization plan along with the initial bankruptcy petition. William Douglas and the bankruptcy progressives railed against
p re-bankruptcy solicitations in the 1930s, and such solicitations were
fo rbidde n from 1938 until Congress again authorized them in 1978.1 2 4
The Commission, by contras t, supported prepackaged bankruptcy: one
staff memo even proposed to expand it significantly by exempting prebankruptcy solicitations from the federal securities laws. 125
The
Commission 's final recommendation was slightly more limited but
nonetheless evinces an unmistakable enthusiasm for prepackaged
bankruptcy and for the flexible Chapter I I reorganization process as a
whole. 126
leased. S ee Elizabeth Warren, T he Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. LJ. Io8o (I998) (analyzing and
a nswe ring studies on bankruptcy spo nso red by the consumer credit industry); Elizabeth Warren,
A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 7I A::vr. BANKR. L.J. 483 (I 997) (cliscussing the
process tha t influenced th e Commission 's reco mm endations about the consum er bankruptcy system ) [hereinafter Warren, A Principled Approach].
123 See Katharine Q. Seelye, First Lady in a 1Yfessy Fight On the Eve of H er Campai gn, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, I999, at AI ("In the spring of I998, Mrs. Clin ton so ught a private tutori al in
bankruptcy law from a H arvard Law professor, Elizabeth Warren, who has strongly opposed the
legislation.").
124 Douglas and the early progressiv es believed that the practice of pre-bankruptcy solicitation
magnifi ed the influence of th e Wa ll Stree t bankers and lawye rs, because it allowed them to take
advantage of the limited information and influence of scatte red in vestors. As noted earlier, the
C handle r Act addressed this conce rn by prohibiting the parties from soliciting the appro val of
banks a nd lawyers until after the co ur t had give n its blessing to the reo rgani zation plan in question. See Pub. L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682 (re pealed 1978). The 1978 Code ex pressly authorize s
pre-bankruptcy solicitations. See I r U.S.C. § 1I26 (1994).
125 See Memorandum from Jay M. Goffman , Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meag her & Flom to Elizabeth Warren, Proposed Amendments to Bankmptcy Code and Securities Laws R elating to Prepackaged Bankmptcy Cases s-6 (June 12, 1997) (on file with the author).
126 S ee 1997 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 121 , ch. 2, at 589- 95 (applying the rules of the
Bankruptcy Code and waiving sec urities law disclosure req uireme nts for solicitations made
within 12 0 days prior to bankruptcy). T he Commission's proposal to exempt prepackaged bankruptcy from the securities laws did not mee t uniform appro val. For example, it drew a concerned
lette r from Richard Walker, General Co un sel of the SEC , who questioned whether the need to
reduce costs and streamline bankruptcy "is a sufficient basis for the elimin atio n of important securities law protections for publi c in vestors pro vided by Securities Act registration." Lette r from
Richard H. Walker, General Cou nse l, SEC, to National Bankru ptcy Re view Commission (Oc t. I ,
1997) (on file with the auth or).
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C learly something has changed in the years since 'Wi lliam Douglas
fi rst campaigned for bankruptcy reform. The reader probably suspects
that th ere are good reasons for the shift in progressives' views, and
there are. M any of the problems that preoccupied Do uglas and his
peers were addressed by the New Deal fin ancial and market reforms,
for in stance; other concerns took their place . To appreci ate how p rogressive thinking has evolved, we must turn to the scholar whose •,vork
con nects D ouglas and current progressives: Ve rn Countryman.
II . VE RN COUNTRYMAN : THE LiNK BE TWEE:': THEN A::'-TD NO\V

Many of us remember from ch ildhood a game call ed "\V hisperi ng
Down the Lane." 127 In \Nhi spering Down the Lane, one child whispers a statement or anecdote to the second ch ild in a chain , and the
second child to a third. By the time the message gets bac k to the fi rst
ch ild , it often bears little resemblance to that child's original statement. Something like this distortion seems to have taken place, a t
least superficially, in progressive bankruptcy scholarship. As w e move
from Douglas to Countryman to Warren, the perspective on bankruptcy changes dramatically. Yet it is also clear that the general goals
- the commitments - of progressive scholars have remained stable.
In this Part, I explain why progressives' vision of bankruptcy has
changed, even as their overall goals have endured. The inquiry leads
us straight to the central link in the chain: Vern Countryman. In w ays
both simple and complex, arising both from his own disposition and
from changes in debtors, investors, and the credit markets, Countryman marks the transition between the past and present of progress ive
bankruptcy theory.
T his Part begins by considering Countryman's personal and intellectual relationship with William Douglas. Despite their close ties,
Countryman's perspective on bankruptcy differed from Douglas's in
three crucial respects. First, Countryman focused far more on personal bankruptcy, whereas Douglas was best known for his work on
large-scale corporate reorganization. Second , unlike Douglas, who repeatedly attacked the bar of his day, Countryman developed a close
working relationship with the bankruptcy bar. Finally, Countryman
was far more skeptical than Douglas of instrumental analysis, as evidenced by Countryman's hostile response to the emergin g law and
economics movement. After developing each of these distinctions in
the fir st section, this Part considers how th ese tendencies have influenced the work of Elizabeth Warren and other current bankruptcy
progressives. By tracing the course of progress ive bankruptcy scholarship from Douglas to Countryman and from Countryman to curren t
l2i

Oth ers may remember the game as "Rumors," "Operato r," or "Telephone."
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scholars, this Part shows how and why the focus of progressive scholars has shifted since its origins in the work of William Douglas.

A. Almost in His Mentor's Footsteps
The link between Vern Countryman and the leading New Deal
bankruptcy progressive, William Douglas, could not be more explicit.
Like Douglas, Countryman grew up in the West and attended college
in the state of Washington. Upon graduating from law school in 1942 ,
Countryman applied for a clerkship with Justice Douglas, who had
been appointed to the Supreme Court just three years earlier. The letter of recommendation written by the dean of Countryman's law
school suggests why Douglas found his application so attractive.
Countryman's credentials were impressive. He graduated third in his
class and served as Presid ent of the Washington Law Review. 128 At
least as impressive, however, was the fact that Countryman had supported himself throughout college and law school. "During the summer vacations," the dean wrote, "he has worked as a manual laborer in
the saw mill and pulp and paper mills at Longview. During the school
years, he has worked part-time." 129 This fact surely reminded Douglas
of his own experiences working himself through college, which he remembered with pride throughout his life. 130 Douglas offered Countryman the clerkship, and he soon became Countryman's mentor.
Countryman served as Douglas's clerk during the 1942 Term,
shortly after Douglas had written several enormously important bankruptcy decisions. 131 Countryman's clerkship was a smashing success,
and in subsequent years, Douglas would repeatedly refer to Countryman as having been one of his best clerks ever.
After his clerkship and a two-year stint in the Army during World
War II, Countryman entered academia, just as Douglas had done. 132

128 See Letter from Judson F. Falknor, Dean, University of Washington School of Law, to Justice William 0. Douglas (June I8, I942) (on file with the Library of Congress, Douglas Papers,
Container No. I I IS). Attached to the letter is a copy of Countryman's law school transcript.
129

Jd.

Douglas's biographer reports that Douglas "had been hired as an all-purpose handyman at
Falkenberg's Jewelry Store" prior to his freshman year at vVhitman College in Walla Walla,
vVashington. "He had also signed on as an early-morning janitor in a candy store and as a dinnerhour waiter in a hash house." SIMON, supra note Ig, at 48. For Douglas's own account of his
crowded college schedule, see DOUGLAS, Go EAST, supra note 64, at 97-98.
131 Two of the most important were Douglas's decisions defining the absolute priority rule. See
Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. sro (I94I); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. ro6 (I9JC)); supra p. Iogz.
132 After the clerkship and his time in the Army, and before leaving for Yale Law School in
I947, Countryman taught for a year at the University of Washington School of Law. See
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS:
rgg8-gg, at 360 (IggS) (containing biographical data for Countryman).
130
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W ith a glowing rec ommendati on from Douglas, 133 he was awarded a
fellowship at Yale Law School for 194 7 and appointed to the Yale fac ulty the following year. N ot surprisin gly, give n his rela tionship with
D ou glas, Co unt rym an chose to specialize in bankruptcy law.
D urin g his years at Yale, Countryman became involved in t he loyalty cases that wo ul d m ire his career in controversy. Lik e m any N ew
D eal liberals , Countryman vvas appalled by the treatment of indi viduals who had been accused of ties to the Com m uni st Party. By the
early rgs os, it w as clear that defending those accused of un-American
acti vities was a dangerous career move fo r a lawyer or law profes sor. 134 Cou ntryman did not f1inch . He vvrote a criti cal book on the
investigation of un-American activities in the state of vVashington and
a series of articles on the plight of lawyers who defen ded ind ividuals
accused of Com m unist Party activities. 135 (Dou glas took a similar
stance from his perch on the Supreme Court, authoring a prominent
dissenting opinion insistin g t hat the defe nd ants ' First Amendment
rights were being violated. 136) Countryman also became actively inv olved in several cases; most galling to the Yale administration w as his
defense of Yale Medical School professor J ohn Peters, who w as accused of un-American activities but later vindicated .!3i
In 195 4, after the law school faculty unanimously voted to grant
Countryman tenure, Yale 's p resident, Alfred Griswold, and the new
law school dean, H arry Shulman, refused to move for ward with his
application. Justice Douglas was a powerful presence in Yale circles
during this era, and when he learned of Countrym an 's troubles, he
sent angry letters to both the president and the dean. "Yale Law h as
had a great liberal tradition, " he wrote to President Griswold:
There are many w ho fe el that th at tradition will suffer grievously if Countryman 's ability and character a re not recognize d. . . . H e has a kee nedged [mind], one of the best I have kno wn. He has, I und erstand, been

13 3 Douglas wrote to Wesley Sturges, a close friend a nd by thi s tim e the de an of Yale L aw
Schoo l:
[Co un tryman] is a first-rate man in every respect. He clid excellent wo rk for me. And I
would rate him as hi gh as any law clerk I have kn own at the Court. . . He has a very
supe ri or mind, great capacity for wo rk, imaginatio n, creative ability, and resourcefulness. He is an unusua lly gifte d person.
Le tter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Wesley A. Sturges, Dean , Ya le Law School (May 3,
1946) (o n file with the Lib rary of Con gress, Douglas Papers, Co ntainer No. I I I 8).
134 Fo r a fasc inating acco unt of the loyalty cases from the pe rspectiv e of Abe Fortas a nd the
Vlashington Jaw firm now called Arnold & Po rter, whi ch was one of th e few Jaw firm s willing to
represent loyalty case de fendants, see L AURA K AL M AN , ABE FORTA S: A B IOGRAPH Y I 25 -5 I

(1990).
135 See so urces cited cited a bove in note 9· For a descrip tio n of Co un try man 's role , a nd of the
Yale tenu re fight desc ribed in th e text below, see K ALMAN, cited above in note q, at 196- 200.
! 36 See De nnis v. United State s, 341 U.S. 494 , 581-92 (1 95 r) (Douglas, ]. , dissenting).
137 See KA LMAN, supra note I?, at I 97 ·
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active in ce rtain loyalty cases. But that too is in the tradition of the law,
at least fro m the time of Erskine who d.efe1.1d.e d Tom Paine in court. 138

To Dean Shul man, Douglas was even more strident: "If Countryman is denied promotion, think of the reaction [of] the lavv clerks of
today. Those who want to teach will look elsewhere . As some yo ung
Yale Law alumni told m e in St. Louis last Saturday, ' Countryman is
the best teacher Yale has today. "' 139
In the end, the Yale admi.nistr<:'!.tion ;,vould not be persuaded. Griswold and Shulman insisted that they had focused on Countryman 's
scholarship, not hi s loyalty acti vities, and t hey attemp ted to defuse the
controversy by offering to reappoint Co untrym an for several more
years and to revisit the tenure issue in the fut ure. Instead of acceptin g,
Countryman resigned.1 40 He vvorked for several years in a V./ashington, D .C. law fi rm, then return ed to academia to accept the deanship
at the University of N ew Mexic o School of Law. I n 1964, Countryman
was appointed to the faculty at Harvard Law School, where he would
spend the fin al two decades of his career. Given Harvard 's longtime
re putation as somewhat stodgy and less cutting-edge than Yale, 141 the
appointment surprised and delighted both Countryman and his mentor. "I have accepted a permanent appoi ntme nt here, " Countryman
wrote to Douglas, "largely because I couldn't resist the opportunity to
sound a dissenting voice fr om t his forum." 14 2 Douglas responded:
"[The appointment is] the nicest thing I have heard about Harvard
Law School in a long time. I cannot believe they are looking for enlightenment but the mere fact that they did tolerate harassment makes
the m deserving of some credit." 14 3
Throughout his career, Countryman did as much to promote
Douglas's reputation as his mentor had done for him. Countryman
was long known as Douglas's principal defender in the academic
world. In 1959, he published a book of Douglas's Supreme Court decisions, and he wrote numerous laudatory articles on the J ustice's

138 Letter fro m Justice William 0. Douglas to Dr. Alfre d Wh itney Griswold, Pre side nt, Yale
U niversity (Jan. 26, I955) (on file with the Library of Co ngress, Douglas Papers, Container No.
I

rr8).

Letter fro m Justice William 0. Douglas to Ha rr; Shulm an, Dean, Yale Law School (Jan. 2 7,
(on file Viith the Library of Congress, Do uglas Papers, Container No. I I I 8) .
140 See KALMAN, supra note I?, at r g8-gg.
141 Harvard's reputation dated back to the rise of legal realism and the attack on Langdellian
legal science in Douglas's era, and included often bitte r attacks by Yale professors on Harvard
Law Sc hool, and vice versa. S ee KALMA N, supra notP. 17, at 25-29.
142 Le tter from Vern Countryman to Justice William 0. Douglas (und ated) (o n file with the Library of Congress, Douglas Papers, Container N o. I I IS).
143 Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Vern Countryman (Jan. 14, I 964) (o n fil e with the
Library of Congress, Do uglas Papers, Container No. 1 r 18).
139
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handiwork. 144 Countryman's close intellectual and personal bond with
D ouglas was a pervasive feature of his ac ademic ca reer, a n d it extended, of course, to Countryman's work on bankruptcy. L ike Dou glas before him, Countryman was the leading progressive bankruptcy
scholar of his era, and he co-authored an influential legal realist casebook on bankruptcy law. 145 Despite the continuities, howe ver, Countryman 's perspecti ve on bankruptcy differed from tha t of D ouglas in
several subtle but crucial respects. These divergences reflecte d both
changes in the world since Douglas's bankruptcy work in the I 930s,
and differences in Countryman himself.
I.
Countryman 's Concentration on Personal B an kru picy. The
most obvious difference between Countryman's writi ngs a n d those of
Douglas is one of emphasis: although Douglas wrote about both personal and corporate bankruptcy, large scale corporate bankruptcy
came to dominate Douglas's attention after his appointment to the
SEC, and he is best known for his work on corporate reorganization.
Countryman, by contrast, showed much more interest in personal
bankruptcy than in business failure. Like Douglas, he wrote on both,
but far more of his work focused on personal bankruptcy. At first
glance, emphasizing personal rather than corporate bankruptcy may
not seem significant. But the two differ in important respects, due in
part to the contrast between individuals and artificial entities such as
corporations. 146 These distinctions figured prominently in the emergence of current progressive bankruptcy theory.
Although it is impossible to know for sure why Countryman gravitated toward personal bankruptcy rather than business issues, there is
a readily inferable connection to his concern for civil liberties and individual freedoms. When asked about Countryman's focus on indi144 See DOUGLAS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A SELECTION OF HIS OPINIONS (Vern Country·man ed., 1959). Countryman's articles on Douglas include Vern Countryman, Scholarship and
Common Sense, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1407 (1980) [hereinafter, Countryman, Common Sense]; Vern
Countryman, Search and Seizure in a Shambles? Recasting Fourth Amendment Law in the Mold
of Justice Douglas, 64 IOWA L. REV. 435 (1979); Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas and Freedom
of Expression, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 301 (1978); Vern Countryman, The Contribution of the Douglas
Dissents, ro GA. L. REV. 331 (1976); Vern Countryman, Business Regulation, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 366 (1974), one of a group of articles in tribute to Justice Douglas; Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, 16 UCLA L. REV. 773 (1969); and Vern Countryman , The Constitution and Job Discrimination, 39 WASH. L. REV. 74 (1964).
145 See VERN COUNTRYMAN & JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS'
RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1951); see also KALMAN, supra note 17, at 189 (describing
Countryman's casebook as squarely within the legal realist tradition). Countryman also coauthored a casebook on lawyers and legal ethics. VERN COUNTRYMAN & TED FIN MAN, THE
LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY (1966).
146 The strongest justification for discharging an individual's obligations- to give her a "fresh
start" that relieves her of her burden of debt and motivates her to try starting anew - applies
much less powerfully to a corporate debtor because corporations are artificial entities that do not
need to be preserved if they are financially unviable.
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'Iidual b ankruptcies, one longtime fr iend and prominent lawyer immediately noted Countrym an 's identifi cation with the "little guy." 14' Another recalled that when Countrym an fir st became invol ved in the
consumer lavv committee of the Ameri can Bar Association, he was a pp all ed that consumer cred itors domin ated the activities whil e debtors
seemed to have no voice.148 It is not sur prising that the bankru ptcy
sc holar w ho defended t he liberties of men and women accu sed of subversion in th e 195 0s a lso stood up for troubled debtors in the dec ades
th at fo ll ovv ed .
J usti ce Douglas was also famou s for his emph asis on individual liberties, of course . In a t ribute to Douglas after the J ustice 's death,
Cou ntryman praised his me ntor fo r taking "a m ore hospitable \'i e\v of
individua l fr eedom under the Constitu tion than a ny other J usti ce before and since,"149 and for "tak[ingj government off the backs of people." 150 B ut these issues were not quite so pressing for ba nkru ptcy
scholars in the 1930s, when Douglas was writing, as they would become in the r 96os, w hen Countryman had assumed the mantle of the
leading progressive bankruptcy scholar. 151 The battles over individu al
liberties in the r 950s may have had a ripple effect on the field of bankruptcy, focu sing attention on the travails of financially troubled debtors. Of much more obvious and immediate significance, however,
were changes in the credit markets.
Prior to World War II, ordinary consumers had only limited access
to credit. Many individuals conducted all of their transactions in cash,
except for credit arrangements with grocers and other small suppliers.
After World War II, consumer credit exploded. In addition to the sustained growth of home mortgage lending, installment credit increased,
and the advent of credit cards made consumer credit available at previously unheard-of levels. The overall effect was unmistakable. As
Countryman frequently noted at congressional hearings and elsewhere,
total consumer credit exclusive of mortgages expanded from $30 billion in 1945 to more than $569 billion in 1974. 152 Along with the vast
Telephone In te rvie w wit h Gerald Smi t h, Lewis & Roca, Phoenix , Ari z. (Aug. 9, 1999).
See Telephone Interview with Professo r Lawrence King, New York University Sch ool of
Law Ouly 20, 1999).
149 Count ryman , Common Sens e, supra note 144, at 1407.
150 !d. (q uotin g Sc hneider v. Smith , 390 U.S I/ , 25 (1968 ) (Dou glas, ]. , di ssen ting)) (in te rnal
qu ota tion ma rks omitted).
151 Countryman may have been eve n m ore committed to civil li be rties th a n was Do uglas. In
an intervi ew many yea rs after his clerkship with Douglas, Countrym an recoun te d their passionate
argum ents on the fi rst J a pa nese in te rnmen t ca se. Co untryma n insisted th a t internmen t \·io lated
Jap anese- American citizens ' F irst Amendm ent righ ts, bu t Douglas vote d wit h the Su preme Co ur t
m ajority to uphold t he wartime m eas ure. S ee SIM ON , supra note r g, at 242-43 (desc ribing Co untryma n 's an d Douglas's a rg uments a bout Hira bayashi v . Uni ted Sta tes, 320 U.S . S r (1943)).
152 See, e.g., C ountryma n, supm note 68, a t r (citi ng F ED . RE SE RVE B UL L. A52, A5 4 (Dec .
I9 70)); id. at A44, A47 Oul y 19 74)). At the same tim e, perso nal bankruptcy filings a lso expa nde d
14 7
148
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expansion of consumer credit and consumer sales came increasing
complaints of creditor mis behavior. The most dramatic response outside of bankruptcy to these developments was the emergence of a
powerful consumer pro tection movement. 153 The effect inside bankruptcy circles was to focus much more attention on personal bankruptcy.154
The postwar tre nds in corporate bankr uptcy also contributed to
this shift in attention. D uring the I 930s, corporate bankru ptcy had
taken center stage as Douglas and other progressives excoriated the
dominance of Wall Street bankers and lawyers in corporate reorganization practice. In the postvvar era, by contrast, corporate bankruptcy
quickly faded as an issue fo r most progressive scholars. T he most obvious reason was a remarkable drop in corporate bankruptcy filings.
I n 1939, the first year of the Chandler Act,155 577 debtors fi led for
C h apter X , the provisions designed for large corporations. O ne year
later, the number d ropped to 2 9 r, and by the mid- r 94os, most years
saw fewer than a hundred new filings .156 After so many firms had
failed during the Depression, and with the markets just getting back
on their feet , bankruptcy did not seem so pressing a concern. Contributing to the lack of urgency was the fact that William Douglas and his
fellow progressives had solved precisely the problems against which
they had railed. 157 T he progressives' great concern had been Wall

dramatically, from II ,OSI in I945 to 97,750 in Ig6o and to 178,202 in I970. See STANLEY &
GIRTH, supra note 83, at 25 tbl.3-r.
!53 Nationally, the consumer advocacy movement was often associated with Ralph Nader and
his allies. Consumer advocates scored important victories in commercial law with the enactment
of such legislation as the Consumer Credit Protection Act of rg68, Pub. L. No. 90-32I, 82 Stat.
I46 (codified as amended at IS U.S.C. §§ I60I-I693r (Supp. IV Igg8)), and state provisions based
on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in I974, UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 7A U.L.A. I (I974).
154 Indeed, Bill Whitford has suggested that personal bankruptcy has become one of the few
remaining strongholds of individualized justice for consumers, given the trend toward class-action
consumer litigation. See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer
Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankntptcy, 68 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 397, 402-03 (I 994).
155 For a discussion of the Chandler Act, see note 67.
156 From I939 to I953, the numbers of Chapter X cases filed were as follows:
I9:l9: S77
I944: 9S
I I}
I_2'l_9_:
I940: 29I
I 94S: 70
r9so: !02
I94I: 29I
I946: 6o
I95 I: 75
I942: I6S
I 9S 2: 64
I947: 94
I94.,: I09
I 9S o: 6I
1948: IOS
See Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judiciary iv! achinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 778 (I97S) [hereinafter 1975-1976 Senate
Hearings].
lSi Because filing for bankruptcy under Chapter X meant that managers of large firms would
lose their jobs to an independent trustee, such managers avoided Chapter X for as long as possi-
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Street's dominance of corporate reorganization .
After Congress
adopted the C handler Act of 1938, the Wall Street bankers and law yers quickly disappeared from corporate bankruptcy. Gone were the
days when m a nage rs, bankers, and the elite bar met in fancy hotels to
d ec ide the fate of large, troubled corporations.
Thus, by the rg6os, the bankruptcy villain h ad changed . Wa ll
Street had declined as a serious threat in ban kru ptC)-', a nd progressive
scholars were increasingly concerned about the enorm ous con sumer
cred it industry. Vern Countryman 's career nicely reflected this shift.
In 1972, Douglas asked Countrym an whether the rg3os SEC R eport
had inspired any though ts on corpora te ban kruptcy. "I read th e eight
volurnes of the SEC Protective Committee study before I re ported to
you for d uty," C ountryman responded, '' but no books or articles resulted."15 8 I nstead , Countryman focused his schol arly energies on the
plight of consumer bankrup ts.
Like Douglas before him, Vern Countrym an almost invariably
sought to convert his proposed reforms into concrete legislative action.
Perhaps his most cherished reform was one that he designed to address
a concern he called "improvident credit extension. " 159 T he inspiration
for Countryman 's proposal was the inclusion in the U nifo rm Commercial Code of a provision precluding the enforcement of "unconscionable" terms in consumer contracts. 16° Countryman argued that Congress should dis allo\\1 the claims of any creditor who had extended
credit to a debtor who later filed for bankruptcy and whom the creditor could not reasonably have expected to pay.161 Although Countryman later persuaded the r 97 3 Bankruptcy Commission to include his
provision in proposed legislation, Congress never adopted it. 162 M ore
successful were Countryman's efforts to expand the bankruptcy discharge in 19 70. Countryman played a prominent role in the campaign
ble. In late r years, th ey increasingly so ught to in vo ke th e less onerous p ro visions of Chapter XI,
whi ch was designed for smaller firm s. See Skeel, supra note 30, at 1341-42.
158 Letter from Vern Co un tryman to Willi a m Douglas (Nov. 15, 1972) (on file with th e Library
of Congress, Douglas Pape rs, Co ntainer No. 11 18).
15 9 Countryman , supra note 68, at r-7.
160 See id. at 9 ("This proposal [an earlier version of Countryman's ultimate proposa l] was
mod eled on § 2-302 of the Uniform Comm ercial Code .... "). Under U.C.C. § 2-302, courts are
a uthoriz ed to inva lidate "unco nscionable" sales transactions. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1997).
161 Countryman proposed that lawmakers defin e an "impro vide nt credit extensio n" as "a contractual exte nsi on of credit to a debtor where it cannot reasonably be expected that the debtor can
rep ay .. . in view of the circumstances of the debtor at the tim e credi t was extended as these circumstances were known to th e creditor or would have bee n re vealed to him on re aso nabl e inqui ry
prior to th e credit exte nsion. " Co untryman , supra note 68, at 23.
162 S ee 1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 121, pt. I, at 2 2 (noting that the proposed § 4403(c) would disallow any "un co nscionable co nsumer claim"). Countryman co ntinued to a dvocate
the pro visi on throughou t the lengthy legislative process that led to the 1978 Code. See , e.g., I975I976 Senate H earings, supra note 156, at 1037 (state ment of Vern Countryman) (arguing for disa llo wance of claim s based on improvide nt credit exte nsions).
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to pass legislation that precluded creditors from bringing state lavl ac-·
tions challenging a debtor's d ischarge after the bankruptcy cas e
ended. 163
In addition to devoting more of his attention to person al bankru ptcy t han Douglas, Countryman also took a crucially different stance
on the appropriate scope of governmental oversight.
Recall th at
Douglas had enthusiastically supported the 1932 proposal to give
bankruptcy officials the authority to delay or condition a debtor 's clischarge.164 Unlike Douglas, w hose vievvs reflected New Deal confidence in paternalistic governmental intervention, Countryman ~v-ehe
mently op posed efforts to limit debtors' access to a discharge. W hen
the consurner creditor industry began to promote legislation to force
more debtors into Chapter 13, Countryman analogized the effort to the
1932 proposal- the same reform D ouglas had sup ported- and larnbasted the earlier legislation as, "to my knowledge, the only proposed
bankruptcy legislation in this country to be characterized by witnesses
as 'UnAmerican. "' 165 Although Countryman thought that creditors
should encourage debtors to use Chapter 13, he also believed that
debtors rather than courts should be the ones to make this decision. 166
It is important to emphasize that Countryman did not simply ignore corporate bankruptcy. To the contrary, he weighed in on the subject throughout his career. Two of his most famous articles - his discourse on executory contracts and his examination of the role of state
law in bankruptcy - addressed issues relevant to both corporate and
personal bankruptcy. 167 Countryman also defended both the SEC's
role in bankruptcy and the preservation of the absolute priority rule in
corporate reorganization. 168 I n the hearings that led to the enactment

163 Prior to the 1970 amendment, Pub. L. No. gr-467, 84 Stat. 990 (1970), creditors often challenged debtors' bankruptcy discharges in state court, alleging that the creditors' claims should not
be treated as discharged due to fraud by the debtors. Critics complained that the suits amounted
to harassment, and many debtors could not afford to contest them. The 1970 amendment required that challenges to a debtor's discharge be brought in the bankruptcy court before the conclusion of the case. See id. at 992-93. For a background discussion of the amendment and its
history, see Vern C. Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. r (1971).
164 See supra pp. 1086-87.
165 Countryman, supra note 89, at 821 (quoting Joint Hearing on S. 3863 Before Subcomms. of
the House and Senate Judiciary Comrns., 73d Cong. 546, 743 (1932)).
166 See Vern Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1460 (1964) (describing the voluntary wage earner plan in Chapter XIII- the predecessor to current Chapter r 3
- as a "solution[] available under the Bankruptcy Act which [is] preferable, from the creditors'
viewpoint, to a straight bankruptcy proceeding").
16i See Countryman, supra note 6 (discussing the role of executory contracts in both corporate
and personal bankruptcy law); Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pis.
I & 2), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 631 (1972) (arguing that Congress should override state law on
various bankruptcy issues, rather than simply adhering to state law in bankruptcy).
168 See Smith, supra note 2, at 4·

2000]

VERN COUNTR VM AN

I I I I

of the I 978 Code, Countryman had several compl aints abou t the I 97 3
Commission's proposal to relax the a bsolute priority rule:16 9
The best that ca n be said for [the Commission 's) formul ation is that the
"fair a nd eq uitabl e" standard [a term of art for the absolute pri ority rule]
is now surro un ded by weasel words . . .. It seems app a rent that the [ I9i3 ]
C ommission 's hope was th at th e court will operate in this leeway to increase the valu a tion on wh ich th e plan is based a nd th us to in crease the
participation of junior interests .... Th is proposa l is not likely to produce
more soun d and succ essful reorganizations a nd I urge the Subcomm ittee to
return to the or igin al "fa ir and equ itabl e" test wit hou t t he leew ayprovidi ng verbiage. 1 70

Countryman's enthu siasm for absolute priority and the SEC underscores his link to William Douglas. But Countryman's principal concern throughout his career was personal bankru ptcy, and in this he
ve ntured beyond his mentor 's footsteps.
2. A Lifelong A lliance with the Bankruptcy Bar. T he second distinction between Countryman and his mentor was in their relationships with the bankruptcy bar. As we have seen, Douglas almost gleefully attacked both the general bankruptcy bar and the elite corporate
reorganization bar. 171 His vision for personal and small busin ess
bankruptcy would have destabilized existing practice, at leas t for
bankruptcy lawyers, and Douglas launched an all-out assault on the
Wall Street lawyers who had dominated large-scale reorganization for
decades.
The relationship between Vern Countryman and the bar could not
have been more different. Although Countryman criticized certain aspects of bankruptcy practice, such as bankruptcy judges' involvement
in both judicial and administrative issues under the old Act, 172 he
worked closely with the bankruptcy bar for decades. By the early
Ig6os, he was a leading presence on the American Bar Association 's
169 The 19 73 Co mmission proposed to retain th e absolute priority rule, but to relax th e valu ation procedure by permitti ng pla ns that gave junior credi tors an interest as long as there was a
"re aso nable basis for th e va luation " an d a '" reaso nable probability ' of full y compe nsating prior
claims and interests. " 1973 COMMISS ION REP ORT, supra note 121, pt. II, at 255 (explainin g
proposed§ 7-303). As finall y enacted , the 1978 Code wen t fur ther, a nd waved off absolu te priority a ltogeth er for any class th at vo ted in favo r of th e plan. See supra p. 1097 .
170 1975-1976 Senate H earings, supra note 156 , at 1043. In te restin gly, give n th e recent deba te
over the so-c all ed new value exception to the absolute priority rul e, Countryman also sharp ly
criticized the 197 3 Commission's proposal to permi t existin g shareholders to parti cipate in a reorganization if they "make a cont ribu tio n whic h is important to the ope ration of the re orga ni zed
debtor." I d. at 1044 (qu oting § 7-303 of the Bankruptcy Act) (internal q uotati on m arks omitted).
171 See supra pp . ro86- 87, 1090.
17 2 He also was willing to cri ticize the judge s th emselves, at least in the aggregate . "The re a rc
some very good prese ntly incumbent bankruptcy judges, " Countryma n to ld Con gress in 1977 ,
"but there a re also som e te rrible ones.
We re a lly need to elevate th e status of this court so that
we can attract better peo ple ." Heari ngs B efm·e the Sub co mm. on Civil and Constitut ional Is su es
of the Ho use Comm. on the Judic iary, 95th Co ng. 25 4 (1977) (state men t of Ve rn Countrym a n).
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bankruptcy committees, and he joined the bankruptcy b a r's principal
reform organization, the National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC), a t
roughly the same time. Countryman later became vice-chair of the
Conference, and he testified before Congress on the NBC's behalf at
hearing after hearing. 1 7 3
Countryman's close ties to the bankruptcy bar are esp ec ially surprising considering that both his seedtime \Vith Will iam D ou glas and
the defiant stance he took in the loyalty cases of the r gs os seemed to
align him squarely against the established bar. 174 Several factors m ay
hel p to make sense of Countryman's rap prochement "With practicing
attornevs. The first is the status of the bar itself. As I describe in the
preceding section, the Chandler Act of 193 8 devastated the elite corporate reorganization bar, ushering Wall Street out of bankrup tcy altogether. Within a few years, corporate reorganization practice lost all of
its cachet and descended to the status that had previously been occupied only by the general bankruptcy bar. 175 T he most prominent \Nall
Street law firms abandoned the practice. A disproportionate number
of the lawyers who filled the gap, and rose to the top of the p ractice in
the I950S , were Jewish. 176 There was an obvious reason for this development. The white-shoe New York firms still discriminated q uite
explicitly against Jews, forcing many bright J ewish law school graduates to look elsewhere for jobs. Given that bankruptcy was a relatively sophisticated practice, and one that did not exclude J ews, it was
an obvious choice.
Unlike the elite Wall Street lawyers of Douglas's d ay, then, the
bankruptcy lawyers that Countryman encountered were themselves
outsiders in the legal profession. One can easily imagine why a scholar
who had risked his academic career to defend outsiders would be
sympathetic to a bar whose leaders also had faced exclusion. I n both
instances, the reason for persecution may have been the same - many
observers suspect that anti-Semitism played a role in the loyalty prose-

173 See, e.g., id. at 238 (memorandum of the National Bankruptcy Conference, represented by,
among others, Vern Countryman, vice-chair).
174 In criticizing loyalty tests for lawyers in 1953, for instance, Countryman pointed out that
"with very few exceptions, these tests have been imposed by, or at least at the instance of, the bar
itself." Countryman, Loyalty Tests, supra note 9, at 149. He complained that "in this instance the
hysterical men [calling for loyalty tests] have had the full support of the American Bar Associa"
tion." !d.
175 I have described this transition in detail elsewhere. See Skeel, supra note 6r.
176 See generally Leonard M. Rosen & Jane Lee Vris, A History of the Bankruptcy Bar in the
Second Circuit, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION LAW IN
THE COURTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES 155, r8r (United States
Courts for the Second Circuit Committee on History and Commemorative E vents ed., 1995) (re"
ferring to the growth of the "smaller, predominently [sic] Jewish firms specializing in bank"
ruptcy").
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cutions, the defendants of which were often Jewish, m just as it did in
shapin g the bankruptcy bar.
A second factor tying Countryman to the bankruptcy bar may have
been the doctrinal bent in his scholarship. Douglas was by nature a
visionary w ho had little in common with the doctrinally oriented
scholars of his time, such as Harv ard's James Mc Lau ghlin. Although
Douglas could adapt his mind to careful doctrinal analy·sis when necessary, his heart lay in idol-smashing reform. Countryman, by contrast, fo und doctrinal analysis far more congenial. 17 8 Even hi s ac tivism in the loyalty cases was firmly grounded in arguments based on
constitutional doctrine, given the goal of persuading courts to acquit
the d efen dants. In his affinity for doctrin al analysis, Countryman had
much more in common with the practicing bar than did Dougl as.
Third, at an important juncture in his career, Countryman himself
left ac ademia to become a practicing lawyer. After he resigned from
Yale in 1955, Countryman joined the Washington, D.C. law firm of
Shea, Greenman & Gardner as a partner, and pursued private practice
for the next four years. This stint as a practicing lawyer brought him
into close contact with the bar, and it was during this time that Countryman began his formal involvement in ABA activities. Both Countryman and the National Bankruptcy Conference figured prominently
on the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, which set the reform
process in motion in the early 1970s, and both made frequent appearances at subsequent legislative hearings.
F inally, during Countryman's career the most prominent bankruptcy lawyers - particularly those associated with the National
Bankruptcy Conference - were unusually interested in promoting reform . To be sure, these lawyers stood to benefit, and did benefit, from
the changes eventually wrought by the 1978 Code. But the principal
motivation for many was a deep commitment to internal reform - to
cleaning up the disreputable aspects of bankruptcy practice. 179
1i i S ee !<.ALMAN, supra note 134, at 132.
1iS Prior to Countryma n, doctrinal bank ruptcy schola rship was often viewed as conservative in

nature. Co untryman was arguably th e first scholar to wed the doctrin a l approach with unmistakably progressive instin cts . This combination is now so pervasive that, in a recent acco unt of
the debates between progressives and law and economics-oriented bankruptcy scholars, Douglas
Baird re fers to the progressives, without irony, as "tradition a lists." S ee Douglas G. Baird, Bank ruptcy's Uncon tested Axioms , 108 YALE L.J 573, 57 6 lrgg8).
1 i9 For a brief descripti on of the bar's campaign to reform bankruptcy law, see Rose n & Vris,
cited above in note q 6, at 182-85. The reformers' principal concern was to alter the role of the
bankru ptcy judge, so that judges no longer performed both administrative and judicia l functions.
Many observe rs believed that judges' in vo lve ment in administrative procedures such as the initial
creditors' meeting made it impossible for them to render truly objecti ve rulin gs when judicial issues arose. For an important discussion of the concerns with the then existing approach by a
leader in the reform effort, see George M. Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdi ct ion: I s it To o Surmnary? ,
39 S. CAL. L. REV. 78 , 85 - 90 (rg66), which discusses perceived conflicts of interest.
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In retrospect, it is difficult to determine which of the factors I h ave
noted are causes , and which are effects, of Countryman's ties to the
b ankruptcy bar. Perhaps Countryman would h ave become a member
and an ally of the National Bankruptcy Conference even if he had
never resi gned from Yal e and entered private practice. Perhaps his
doctrinal bent was a result of, rather than a bas is for, his affinity for
th e ba r. Whatever the sequence, the important point is that C ountrym an clearly vie\v ed t he practicing bar as fri end rather than foe. I n
this respect, as in his focu s on personal bankruptcy, Countrym a n
charted a very different course from the one that Douglas had taken.
J. The Rise of Law and Economics. A fin a l development marking
the transition from Douglas to Countryman is the emergence of the
law and economics movement in the 1970S. T he early law and economics movement was in strumentalism wri t lar ge. Law and econ omics scholars assume that individuals tend to pursue their own selfinterest and will alter their behavior in response to legal rules. According to these scholars, legal rules should be designed to promote the
efficient allocation of resources. In bankruptcy, the earliest law a nd
economics analyses suggested that lawmakers could counteract the
surge in personal bankruptcy filings by reducing the amount of property that debtors could exempt from creditors. Making bankruptcy
less generous, the reasoning went, would discourage debtors from discharging their obligations. 1 so
With its emphasis on instrumentalism, law and economics pursues
a theme that dates back to Douglas and other early legal realists. Recent progressives have almost universally rejected the law and economics approach, ho·wever. These scholars criticize law and economics
analysis for relying on simple but unsubstantiated assumptions about
the behavior of debtors and others. 181 Because law and economics
scholarship does not account for the intricate factual context in which
actual debtors and creditors interact, its conclusions are inherently
suspect.
Although law and economics entered the bankruptcy literature late
in his career, Countryman shared the skepticism of current progressives toward its methods and simplistic prescriptions. An exchange
between Countryman and Douglas that dates back to the earliest years
180 S ee, e.g., William H. M ec kling, Financial Markets, Defau lt, and Bankruptcy: The Role of
th e State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. P ROBS . 13, 2 7 (1977) ("Chan ges in bankruptcy law which lower
th e cos ts or raise the benefits to debto rs of one of [the bankruptcy or informal settlement options]
. . . will wi thout question in crease ... the total number of debtors wh o el ect [that option].").
181 For example, Teresa A . Sulliv a n, Elizabeth Warren , and J ay Law rence \Nestbrook have
co mplained that to Meckling a nd other early economics-base d sc hola rs, th e "bald assertion th at
ma nipulatin g the laws would p rodu ce predictabl e effects in d ebto r behavior . . was evidently so
obvious as to require no empiri cal substantiation." SULLIVAN, WARRE N & WESTBROOK, supra
note 82 , at 232 .
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of C ountryman 's career fores hadows much of the hostility that progressive scholars have for the reductive, and often poli tically conservative, tendencies of law and ec onomics scholarship. After returning
fro m a 1948 visit to the U niversity of Chic ago , whose Aaron Director
is considered by some as the fathe r of law a nd economics, Countryman
did not mince his words:
I ' m a fraid I d on ' t sha re your h igh opi ni on of t he p lace 1 8 2 In m y jud gm e nt it's nothin g but a n in d oct rin a t ion sc h ool a nd t he doc trine w hi ch it
sell s is the class ical eco n om ic th eory· of H enry Sim on as exp ou nded by h is
su ccessor, Aaron Director. My objec ti on is not so m u ch t hat I con s id er it
poor doctrin e - w hi ch I do - a s th at eve ryo ne at C hi cago seem s tn
p reach it. 183

D uring his years at H arv cm:J Law School, Coun tryman witn essed
first hand the rise and increasi ng dominance of law and economics in
ba nk ruptcy scholarshi p. The pioneering infl uenc e w as Thom as J ac kson , a young Stanford law professor who em ployed law a nd econ omics
m ethodology in his "creditors' bargain " theory of bankruptcy law. 18 4
As articulated by Jackson and his frequen t co-author, D ouglas B aird ,
and applied to a wide ran ge of bankruptcy issues , the creditors' bargain theory argues that the goal of bankruptcy is to provide a collective solution to financial distress. By forcing creditors to halt their individual collection efforts, bankruptcy law prevents them from
engaging in a "race to the courthouse," with creditors dismembering a
potentially viable firm in their zeal to collect wha t the debtor ovves
them. Bankruptcy sho uld not do more than this , however. In particular, bankruptcy should not alte r nonbankruptcy law except to the
extent necessary to facilitate an orderly, collective insolvency proceeding. According to B aird and J ackson, deviations from nonbankruptcy
law for other purposes would lead to costly, inefficient jurisdictional
b attles between parties who fare better in bankruptcy and those who
prefer their entitlements under state law. By the mid-rg8os, the creditors ' bargain model domi nated bankruptcy discourse. In I g86 , another prominent law and economics scholar announced in a review of
Baird 's and J ackson 's bankruptcy casebook that th e creditors ' bargain
182 Do uglas 's optimism about the U ni ve rsity of C hicago Law Sc hool was based on his fri endship with Robert Hutchin s, a ferve nt legal realist w ho left Ya le to beco me President of the U niversity of Chicago in 1929 .
183 L ette r from Vern C ountrym a n to \Nilliam 0. Douglas (Oct. 28 , 1948) (on file with the Library of Congress, Douglas Files, Co nta iner No. I I r8).
18 4 J ac kson first articulated th e creditors' bargain theory in T homas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,
N on-Ba nkruptcy Entitlem ents, and th e Crediton' BG1·gain, 91 YA LE L.J. 85 7, 859-7 r (r 982). H e
co-a uth ored several subsequ ent ela borati ons of the theory wit h D ouglas Baird, see, e.g., Douglas
G. Bai rd & Thomas H. Jackso n, Co1·porate R eorganizati ons and the Treatmen t of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequat e Pm tec tion of S ecured Crediton in Bankruptcy, 5 I U.
C HI. L. REV. 97 (r984), and eve ntu a lly published the analysis a_<; a book, THOMAS H . J ACKSON,
T HE L OGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRU PTCY LAW (1<:)86)
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th eory had "set the terms of the scholarly debate for the next decade." 18 5 Although other scholars grumbled, 186 law and economics had
bec ome, and has remained, the most prominent m ethodology in bankruptcy scholarship.
T he creditors' bargain model embodies precisely t he characteristics
t hat Countryman had complained about in his letter to Dou glas decades earlier. Baird and Jackson assume, for example, t hat creditors
ope rate in competitive credit markets and th at changes in b ankruptcy
law will therefore have a direct effect on both thei r w illingness to extend credit and the interest rates they ch arge - otherwise, it w ould
not be so important that bankruptcy law repli cate nonb ankruptcy law.
Baird 's and J ackson's confidence in market forces comes straight from
t he classical economics that Countryman h ad criticized after his visit
to the U niversity of Chicago. Countryman rem aine d deeply skeptical
of these kinds of arguments, and their relia nce on t heory rather t han
empirical data, throughout his career. In one of his last publications, a
I 985 article on preferential transfers, Countryman took direct aim at
Baird and Jackson, both of whom were participants in the symposium
for which he wrote the article. The theoretical approach of Baird,
J ackson, and other law and economics scholars to an issue like preferential transfers, Countryman complained, was inadequate:
[The assumptions of these scholars leave them] free from the burden of
scrutinizing the vast judicial output that reveals how the current preference law is being administered - a subject in which they evince little interest. . . . I confess to sharing the reaction of Professor Richard Markovitz after he had listened to another preacher of the true gospel. H e
suggested that the answer to the question, "How many Chicago economists does it take to change a lightbulb?" was: "None. If it needed
changing, the market would have changed it alre ady' ' 18 7

Countryman's views on the Harvard Law School appointments
process provide additional evidence that his hostility toward law and
economics analysis did not mellow over time. After Thomas Jackson
spent one year as a visiting professor at H arvard from I 985 to r 986,
t he law school voted to give him a permanent position. By all accounts, Countryman fiercely opposed the appointment. 188 Countrym an viewed law and economics as a pernicious influence on policy debates in bankruptcy, and he refused to support the scholar whose work
!85 Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Credit ors' B argain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L.
R EV. 6go, 692 (I g86).
186 S ee, e.g., Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note I 14, at 8 1 I- I 2 (quoting this claim and sugges ting that law and economics an alysis, though "seductive," is misg ui ded).
187 Vern Countryman, The Conce pt of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy , 38 VAND. L. REV.
713,827 (rg85) (citations omitted) .
188 See, e. g., Telephone Interview with Maura Kelly, Assista nt to Vern Countryman (Nov. I 2 ,
1999). Jackson left Harvard to become Dean of the Uni versity of Virginia School of Law in rg88.
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had played so central a role in bringing this methodology to bankruptcy.
Unlike Douglas, then, who had relied on instrumental assu:inptions
in his own v;ork on personal and small business bankruptcies, Country:rHan strongly rejected the new instrumentalism. I explain b.::lovv
that this hostility to law and economics scholarship has become an imoortant element of t he scholarship of Elizabeth '.Narren r:md oth e1· t::cen. t progressi··ves.

B.

';{'r-acing

the ThYeads to Cun-ent Progressi?Je ScholaYsh

E a.cb of the factors that I consider -

the emphasis on.
than corporate bankruptcy, the close ties to the bankruptcy bar,
t rte hostility to law and economics analysis - has come to defi ne
prc•gressive bankruptcy scholarship. An important effect has been to
displace several elements of the early progressive vision of bankruptcy,
and to produce the surprising differences between the work of 'William
Douglas and that of Elizabeth Warren and other recent progressives.
This section considers how each of the characteristics emphasized in
the previous section manifests itself in the work of \Narren and other
current progressives.
The parallels between Countryman and Warren are most obvious
in their shared emphasis on personal bankruptcy. For both, the bete
noire is the consumer credit industry, and its efforts since the r g6os to
force more debtors to make payments under a rehabilitation plan
rather than receive an immediate discharge. In response to the credit
industry's calls in t he r g6os for stricter bankruptcy laws, Countryman
argued that creditors' standards for issuing credit were far too lax. 189
Subsequent progressive scholars continue to sound these themes, and
to argue that de btors' access to the bankruptcy discharge must be protected.
T his emphasis on personal bankruptcy has had an important indirect effect on progressive scholars' views of corporate bankruptcy. As
described in the last section, Countryman's passion for personal bankruptcy caused him to de-emphasize his stance on corporate bankruptcy
issues. In response to the increasing importance of corporate bankruptcy in recent years, subsequent progressives have shown much
more interest in this area, and many seem to have projected their
vievvs on personal bankruptcy into the corporate context. :Much as
they emphasize the fresh start for individual debtors, current progressives similarly insist that corporations should be reorganized rather

139 See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 68, at s-6 ("[T]here is evidence ... that institutional credit
extenders will often overcommit the debtor even when they have accurate credit [information).").
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than liquidated whe never possible. 190 P rogressive scholars have therefore applauded the cha nges \Vrought by the 1978 Code: its kind er, gentler version of the absol ute priori ty rule; its assumption t hat a debtor 's
managers rather than a court-appointed trustee should continue to ru n
the firm in bankruptcy; and its gen erous treatmen t of attorneys' fees.
Although some progress ive scholars - notably, Elizabeth Warren 191 have kept the d ifferences betwee n personal and corporate bankruptcy
firmly in view, m any ten d to trea t the two contexts as interc hangeable.
Insights carried over from person al bankrup tcy, and the commitment
to a fr esh start, fig ure prominently in progressive scholars' corporate
bankruptcy analysis . Pe rhaps the most dramc.tic example of this
b lending of contexts is an article suggesting that corporate bankruptcy
should be analogized to "group therapy." 192
On the second facto r, Countryman's affinity for the bankruptcy
bar, Elizabeth Warren and other recent p rogressives have reta ined the
close ties. Rather than ch allen ging the bar, as Dou glas did, current
progressives closely ally t hemselves in policy debates with bankruptcy
lawyers and organizations such as the N ational Bankruptcy Conference. If anything, recent progressives' commitment to flexible reorganization rules may have stren gthened the connection by removing an
importa nt source of conflict between the practicing bar and earlier
progressives. Whereas Countryman at best tolerated the shift to
Chapter r I , current progressives actively embrace the more malleable
reorganization regime.
With respect to the third factor, the rise of law and economics, current progressives remain just as hostile as Countryman himself. In
personal bankruptcy, this has meant a v igilant defense of the fresh
start, at times to the exclusion of other perspectives. Gone is a ny serious suggestion that bankruptcy should be used instrumentally to shape
debtors' behavior. T h e occasion a l exceptions to this sta nce have a distinctly populist flavor. In defending the recent N ational Bankruptcy
C ommission , for example , Elizabeth Warren emphasizes that the
190 S ee, e.g., GROSS, sup;·a note 22, at I29 (arguin g that "rehabi litation is facilitated by curtailing creditors' options a nd is justified because debtor r~ habilitati o n trum ps creditor choice"); Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note I I 4, at 787 ("C hapte r I I of the Bankruptcy Code gives bankrupt businesses another op portun ity to succeed .... [T]he revi val of an otherwise failin g business
a lso serves the distribu tio nal in terests of many who are not technically ' creditors' but w ho have
a n interest in a business's conti nued existence.'').
19 1 Se e, e.g., Warren, supra note 96, at 341 ("Co nsum er bankrup tcy policy ri ghtly co nce rn s itse lf
wit h the fres h start in ways th at a re not nearly so pressing fo r co rporate deb tors. . . . Analogies
between th e two may so metim es be ap t, but t he circum stances differ suffici ently to justi fy discrete
policy di sc ussions.').
192 Dona ld R. Korobkin, RehabilitGting Values: A Juri spmdence of Bankruptcy, 9I COLUM. L.
REV. iii, 722 (I99 I). Korobkin characteri zes corporate bankruptcy as "creating condi tio ns for a
disco urse in which values of participants may be rehabilitated into a coherent and informed vision of ... the enterp ri se. " ! d. at 789.
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Commission's proposal s would curb abuses of the bankruptcy law by
wealthy debtors while protecting more traditional debtors' fre sh
start.1 93
In corporate bankruptcy, the influence of law and economics scholars hip has given progressive sc holars still another reason to defend a
"fresh start," or reorganization-based, view of Chapter I I. Law and
economics scholars, preoccupied \vith deterring inefficient behavior by
de btors and their managers, tend to call for strict enforcement of credito rs' priority rights, even when this practice diminishes the likelihood
of reorganization. 194 More recent i.v ork has taken this impulse further,
an d suggests that Congress should repl ace the current Chapter I I with
market-driven, liquidation-based al ternati ves. 195 In response to this
literature, which progressive scholars view as creditor-oriented and
conservative, they have dug in their heels. They, along with the practicing bar, fiercely defend the existing framework.
The methodological response of progressive scholars to the law and
economics movement is at least as striking as their rejection of its policy recommendations. As law and economics pervaded the literature,
an obvious response would have been to articulate a competing normative theory of bankruptcy. Rather than suggesting such a theory,
however, several leading progressive scholars have focused on empirical work. The most prominent illustration is the extensive study of
personal bankruptcy by Elizabeth Warren and her co-authors 196 - a
study that has led both to a second personal bankruptcy study 197 and
to an investigation of business bankruptcy. 198 This focus on empirical
work is very much in the spirit of Countryman's work. Countryman
long emphasized the need for empirical data and criticized its absence
in most law and economics scholarship. 199 Subsequent progressive
193
19 4

Se e Warren, A Principled Appmach, supra note 122, at 491-506.
The pioneering work in the 198os of Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson initiated this
trend. Baird's and J ac kso n's "creditors' bargain" model called for strict compliance with state
law priority rules. See, e.g., J ACKSON, supra note 184; Baird & Jackso n, supra note 184.
195 Se e supra note III. The m os t recen t analysis by law and eco nomics sc holars focu ses on the
possibility that firm s could devi se their own bankruptcy rules by contract rather than depending
entirely on state-supplied bankruptcy laws. See generally Alan Sc hwartz, A Contract Th eory App1·oach to Business Bankntptcy, 107 YALE L]. r8o7 , r8o8-o9 (1998) (developing a model of
bankruptcy contract that could be adjusted to refle ct a debtor 's arrangements with subsequent
creditors); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A R ep ly to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE
L]. 317 (offering a sustai ned critique of Sc hwartz 's model).
196 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82 .
197 TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L WESTBROO K, THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN FINANCIAL CRISIS (2000).
198 Se e Warren & Westbrook, supra note So, at 1258 (describing their projected business bankruptcy study).
199 See generally SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82, at 265 n.8 ("Vern
Countryman is another scholar who has long lamented the absence of useful data in the bankruptcy area a nd who has been wary of economic models with no data to back them up. ").

II20

HAR VA RD LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. r 13

107 5

scholarship continues the critique, seeking to remedy the lack of empirical data. 200
In sumrnary, current progressive scholars fo llovv Vern Countryman's cues in each of the areas that I consider. They continue to place
particular emphasis on personal bankruptcy; they have retained close
ties to the b ankru ptcy bar; and they continue to criticize t he 'ivork of
law and ewnomics sc holars. In personal bankruptcy, these positions
have inspired a :redoubled commitment to de btor protection 2.nd a distaste for proposa.ls that a re designed to shape debtor b;::havior. Both of
these commitments closely parallel Countryman's O\'o'Tl vie >;;,rs. In corpora i:e bankruptcy, by contrast, current progress.l /c scholars take a
ve:cy di.fferen t. stance than Countryman doe:s , '\Nhen=:as CountryTnan
con tin ued to defend SEC oversight and strict enfo:ccer.nent of the absolute priority rule , his successors embrace t he fa.r rnore fl exible regime
embodied in Chapter r r.
T he evolution from Douglas through Countryman to ·warren and
the present has taken progressive bankruptcy scholarship far from the
concerns of earlier progressive scholars. The question that remains is
what to make of these developments.
III . TWO STORIES ABOUT THE PROG RESSIVE LEGACY

As we have seen, the course of progressive bankruptcy scholarship
m the past seventy years provides a vivid illustration of the influence
that one generation of scholars exerts on the next. Almost as intriguing as the threads that link Douglas to Countryman, and Countryman
to ·warren and other current progressives, is the fact that progressive
thinking seems, in some respects, to have reversed its course. The
work of Vern Countryman serves as a pivot point between W illiam
Douglas and t he sometimes different concerns of progressives today.
This Part attempts to make sense of these developments. I argue
that, in both personal and corporate bankruptcy, one can tell two stories about the evolution of progressive scholarship. O n the one h and,
the optimistic account suggests that progressive scholars have simply
responded to changes in markets and other background institutions
and that current progressives' vision of bankru ptcy reflects the same
core val ues as their predecessors held. The pessimistic story, on the
other hand, worries that important concerns may have been lost, or at

200 Progressive scholars have tended to rely on traditional empirical methods- such as the use
by Sullivan , Warren, and Westbrook of data gathered from bankruptcy filing documents and interviews- a strategy quite similar to William Douglas's earlier approach. Law and economics
schola rs (and economists), by contrast, have focused on mathematical analysis of stock prices and
other precisely quantifiable data.
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In the context of personal bankruptcy, I find the opti:tnistic story
q uite compelling. Although the optimi stic story also proves plausib le
for corporate bankruptcy, the grounds for accepting t h e pessim.i.stic
story a p p ear st ronger. An important progressive critique s;::e:ms r.o
have dis a pp.e:ared, a n d I outline what t h at critique might look Eke if
~;r egr e ss i ve scholars were to pick up that t hrea d -- r ight vv h ere ' l er:n
C~ o·!..lntryrn arl left it.

A. An OJ..?timistic View of Progressive Thi nking
on PeYsonal BankntJ.'ltcy
The p essimistic story a bout progressive t hinking on person al D ':1D.1~>
nJ.ptcy w ould go something like this: in the beginning, the progressives
develo ped a careful, n uanced view of the proper ro le of person al bankruptcy. Although Douglas was wary of creditor overreaching and saw
b ankru p tcy as a crucial safety valve for those in fi nancial distress, he
also believed that bankruptcy law could b e u sed to encourage fiscal responsibility on the part of future debtors. 202 A successful bankruptcy
system would thereby d iminish t he need for bankruptcy r elief. Over
the years, progressive bankruptcy theory has lost its nuance. Many
current progressives are so concerned w ith fending off the consumer
credit lobby, and with protecting debtors' access to bankruptcy, tha t
they have little to say a bout anything else.
Although p rogressive thinking on bankruptcy does seem to have
simplified its goals in some respects, the optimistic account offers a
compelling explanation for this and other trends in current progressive
scholarshi p . Part of the explanation lies in Douglas's wor k itself. Although Douglas is widely rem ~ m bered as one of the most liberal Su p reme C ourt J ustices of the century, his early views on bankruptcy
we re in many respects quite conservative .203 Dou glas's e arly work often focused less on reining in creditors than on influencing debtors '
behavior. G iven the increasingly important need to rein in creditors, it

201 I have borrowed the term "translation" from Lawrence Lessig 's influ ential work in constitu tional law. See, e.g., Lawrence L essig, Unders tanding Changed Readings: Fideli ty and Theory, 4 7
STAN. L. REV . 395 , 400-or (1995).
202 See supra p. roSs .
203 Some commentators have characterized Dougl as's early academic stance as a strategy o f
calculated neutrality designed to further his academic ambitions. See, e.g., SIM ON, supra note rg,
at ro8 ("[F]o r Douglas the amb itious yo ung assistant professor of law at Yale, pushing ha rd for
pro motion a nd re cognition in hi s field of comm~rcial law, t he restraint was not surprising."). My
own conclusion is that Douglas's writings accurate ly reflected h is views in the early I9J OS. It is
worth noting in thi s regard that, as reform-minded as it was, the Progressive political movement
of t he early r goos was itse lf con se rv ati ve in many essential resp ec ts. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE
TRICMPH OF CO NSERVATISM 2 (rg67).
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is not surprising that subsequent progressive scholarship has sought to
shift the balance. 2 0 4
In addition, the concerns that Vern Countryman and subseq uent
progressives have voiced about the consumer credit industry reflect
important changes in the consumer credit market. Consumer credit
has exploded in recent decades, and the success of the consumer credit
industry's massive lobbying effort in the past several years attests to its
enormous power. 205 1\!Ioreover, since the late rg(os, when credit card
interest rates were effectively deregulated, consumer creditors have
moved down the economic ladder, lending to consumers with lower
and lower incomes. 206 One can debate, of course, whether these developments should be facilitated, rei ned in, or left alone. I n the optimistic
story, progressives have increased their emphasis on protecting debtors
as creditors' clout has increased and as potentially vulnerable, lowerincome debtors have become an important part of the credit economy.
There are also grounds for optimism in the positive content of current progressive scholarship. Although current progressive scholars
sometimes seem to do little more than attempt to fend off the critical
(and often pro-creditor) insights of law and economics, the empirical
focus of leading progressive scholars provides an increasingly nuanced
view of debtors and the bankruptcy framework. Progressive scholars
have shed new light on the effect that local legal culture has on issues
such as debtors' decisions whether to seek rehabilitation or an immediate discharge. 207 This work on local legal culture may provide valuable insights into the limits of legislative change. 208 Recent progressive
scholarship also focuses on important issues that did not figure prominently in the work of Douglas and other early progressives, such as
2 04 Vern Countryman's own writing is instructive in this regard. Although he referred on several occasions to Wesley Sturges's pioneering work on consumer bankruptcy, see, e.g., Countryman, supra note 68, at 6-8 (referring to Sturges as "a keen student of credit practices" and discussing Sturges's proposal for altering creditor default rights), Countryman rarely cited Douglas's
scholarship in this area.
205 See Warren, A PYincipled Appmach, supra note 122, at 486-88.
Z06 For an extensive discussion of this phenomenon, see David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson,
The Rise of Consuma Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, OY Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3II,
332-46 (I999).
207 Important recent contributions include Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth vVarren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal CultuYe: 1'<-venty Yean of Evidencefmm the Fedem/ Bankruptcy Courls, I7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y Soi (I994), and Jean Braucher, LawyeYs
and ConsumeY Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. SOI (I993), which
documents variation among districts in the percentage of debtors who invoke Chapter 13 rather
than Chapter 7, see id. at 502--03.
208 For example, these variations in the percentage of debtors who seek rehabilitation rather
than immediate discharge suggest that changes that give significant discretion to the bankruptcy
judge -such as the 1984 amendment of Bankruptcy Code section 707(b) authorizing judges to
prohibit a debtor's use of Chapter 7 if it would be a "substantial abuse," I I U.S. C. § 707 (I 994)will do little to alter current patterns in debtors' choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
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questions of race, gender, and e:thnicity, and how they relate to bankru ptcy. I n their 1989 book , As }Ve Forgive OuY De btors, w·arren and
her co-authors offer one of the first detailed considerations of the effect
of bankruptcy on women. Their work indicates that single women
w ho file for bankruptcy have much lo\ver incomes than single m en
an d are unusually vulnerable to finan cial hardship even after bankru ptcy.209 I n their for t hcoming book , Warren and he r co-authors consider these and other demographic variables in more detaiP 10 As progress ive sc holars continue to explore th ese issues, their insights should
deepen our understanding of how financial distress varies across
demograp hic groups and communities and how· Congress might reform
th e Bankruptcy Code to accoun t for these factors.
B . A New (and Old) Progressive Critique of Corporate Bankruptcy

As I describe above, recent progressives have embraced an approach to corporate bankruptcy that is very simil ar to the bankruptcy
regime that Douglas attacked. As with personal bankruptcy, the shift
in attitude can be explained as a response to important changes that
have occurred since the r 930s.
An optimistic explanation for progressives' defense of existing practice is that the excesses Douglas and others railed against have been
curbed. In the 1930s, Wall Street monopolized reorganization practice,
to the detriment of small investors. New Deal financial reforms such
as the Glass Steagall Act 2 11 weakened the grip of J.P. M organ and its
peers on corporate finance. 212 Douglas and the SEC completed the
project and ushered Wall Street out of corporate bankruptcy by insisting that a trustee be appointed in large bankruptcy cases and prohibiting the debtor's current bankers or lawyers from serving as trustee or trustee's counseP 13 By the time Congress eliminated the
mandatory trustee requirement in 1978, Wall Street had long since disappeared from bankruptcy. With the practice no longer dominated by
209 See SULLIVAN, WARRE N & WESTBKOOK, supra note 82, at 147, IS I. Another prominent
progressive, Karen Gross, devotes a lengthy re view of As We Forgive Our Debtors to the boo k 's
findings abo ut women debtors and calls for further femini st inqui ry. See Karen Gross, R e-Vision
of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of In dividual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. r so6, ISI0- 12
(1990).
210 See SULLIVAN, WARRE N & WE STBROOK, supra note 197.
211 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S. C. §§ 24, 78, 3 7778 (1994)) (repealed 1999).
212 The most important rece nt di sc ussion of these developments is MARK ]. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1994).
213 As Douglas predicted in a letter to President Rooseve lt before t he Chandler Act was enacted, "the reorganization study a nd in vestigation . . . is now cu lminating in a comprehensive
legislati ve program which should go far towards car rying in to the reo rganization field the high
standards for finance which yo u have sponsored. " SIMON, sup1·a note 19, at rs6 .

II24

HARVARD LAW REVIE W

[Vol. IJ.3:I075

a smaJl gro-up of elite Ia\v:iers, restorir1g ±1e}:ibi llt~y to co:rriorate reo r·•
•
'
r-,'1
•
'
1 • ·
•
ga n1zat10n
m a ch~ sense .
1 ne mterests ol small puotJ.c n.\\'estor s llave
also changed . ·w hereas earlier investors generally purchased bond s
a nd might benefit as credi tors fr om stric t enforcement of i:.he absolute
priority rule, small investors now a re more likely to invest in stock a n d therefore will receive nothing in bankrup tcy if the J.ov;~:st priority
in terests are cut off.
Other im portant legal changes furt her rei nforced the us·:;fulness o:f z:.
±lexi ble reorganization framework . Perhaps the most dramatic of these
changes \Vas the advent of mass torts, an issue that did no t exist in
ea rlier generatio ns. \Nith p reviously robust firm s like John s lVIanville
and A.H . Rob ins strugglin g under the crush of thous ands of ]a\vsuits,
it arguably w as in all of the parties ' interests to d eal with th~ problems
in a single forum .214 Bankru ptcy emerged as the one forum t hat
seemed to compensate victims , preserve the comp any's b usiness, and
take other distrib utional issues into account.
These, of course , are precisely the kinds of arguments t h 2J vVarren
and other progressive schola rs make. They argue that curren t corporate ban krup tcy law, with its sympathy fo r a debtor's managers and
relaxed a p p roach to creditors' p riorities , is ap propriately designed to
reconcile the interests of a wid e range of parties. 215
The optimistic story has a powerful logic, but one can also make a
strong case for a m ore pessimistic conclusion: progressive scholars
h ave allied them selves too closely with the corporate bankruptcy bar.
Alth ough this sympa thy for the ba r is understandable, it is important
to note h ow much the bar has ch anged since the p ush for b an kru ptcy
reform in the I g6os. I n the w ake of the r 978 C ode, the nation 's elite
fir ms rediscovered bankr uptcy; the most prominent bankruptcy lawyers now w ork for many of the same big city firms that domin a ted
corporate reorganization in the d ays of the early progressives.216 I n
view of these changes, there may still be a need for aspects of the old
p rogressive critique - the perspective p assed d ow n from D ouglas to
Countrym a n b ut left behind by curre nt p rogressive scholars .
1 '

~

War ren points out:
W hen peo ple spea k of th e ni ghtm a re of the John s Man ville tru st or t he Eastern Airlines
deb acle, it is well to think of the d ebacle outside ba n kru ptcy. No do u bt so me asbestosis
claim a nts w ould have collected big judgments in full , but at som e po int - a t t he roo th
claima nt, or the roooth, or the roo,oooth - M a n ville w ould have bee n o ut of mo ney
and th e later victim s w ould have receive d nothing.
\Va rre n, Better Alte rnative, supm note 114, a t r 6.
21 5 See, e.g., Warre n, supra note 96, at 343- 44 (de scribi ng the goals of t he b usiness bank ru ptcy
syste m with im p li cit app rova l).
21 6 S ee Rose n & Vris, supra note q 6, a t rs6 (noting that 49 of t he so largest r·~e w York firms
now de sc ribe themsel ves as having bankruptcy expertise); id. at rSs (describin g the subst a ntial
bankruptcy p ractices of Sim pson, Thache r & Bartlett, Shearm a n & Sterling, a nd W hite & Case).
21 4
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C onsider the two ben chmarks of the :;: 930s critique: ba:nker-la\.vye r
con i1icts of :interest and the status of a debtor's managers in bank~
D
~,
ruptcy. ri. "tw 1\
l~ew
· ea l re f orms so l vea' tne most trou bl'mg con!llcts
problem by slamming shut the doors of bankruptcy on Wall Street. As
corporate bankruptcy practices at large firms have expanded in recent
years, ho•.vever, nevv conflicts of interest have emerged . Prominent
lav;yers su ch as Harvey Miller are invohred in so :rnany of the leading
cases that tney oft:::n have ties to parties wi th poten tialiy adverse interests . In the Leslie Fay case, for instance, J'viiller 's finn, "Weil, Gotsh al
& ManE'·es , represented several significan t creditors , as well as the
de btor, L eslie Fay. Because Weil , Gotshal never d isclosed the con±lict
to the court , the bankruptcy judge required th e firm to pay the
$8oo,ooo cost of the investi gation that rooted out the conflict. 21 7
The progressive response to these concerns about conflicts of interest has been surprisingly muted. During its deliberations on the current Bankruptcy Code, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
initially adopted a proposal to weaken the Code's "disinterestedness"
requ irement for attorneys and only later reversed itself.2 18 If progressive scholars were to take a vigorous stance on this issue 1 how might
the critique look?
The most obvious step would be for progressives simply to insist on
strict cont1icts standards . Progressives might question, for instance ,
whether bankru ptcy truly warrants more flexi ble standards than those
used in other contexts . Even more interesting would be to focus on
the institutional issue of who should be authorized to regulate the conflicts issue. T he conflicts problem could provide a valuable opportu nity to reverse one of the most remarkable effects of the I 9 78 bankruptcy reforms , the dramatic scaling back of the SEC's role in
corporate bankruptcy. 21 9 B efore 1978, the SEC served as the principal
representative of the interests of public investors in bankruptcy. The
197 8 Code culminated a long erosion of the SEC's role by sharply restricting the SEC's int1uence. Since 1978, there h as been only limited
1

21 i

See In re Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525 ,539 (Ban kr. S.D.N.Y 1994).
The 1997 Commission initially proposed to amend the Bankruptcy Code's "disinterestedness" standard to preclude an attorney from representing the debtor only if she had a "material "
conflict of interest. Fo r discussion of these events, see Todd J. Zywicki, !vi end It, Don't End [t:
Th e Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in Possess ion's Professionals, r 8 MISS. C. L. REV. 291 (rggS). For an argument defending more fl exible stand a rd s, see Gerald K. Smith, Standards for the Employment of Professio nals in Bankl-uptcy Cases: A R esponse to
Professor Zywi cki's Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requireme nt for Debto1· in Possession's Professionals, rS MISS. C. L. REV. 327 (rgg8). See also G. Ray Warner, Qf GYin ches, Alchemy and DisinteYestedness: The Commission's Magically Disappem·ing Co nfl icts of Interest, 5
AM. BANKR INST. L. REV. 423 (1997) (c ritici zi ng the proposal to relax conflict of interest standard s) .
2! 9 For a detailed discussion of the Code's repudiation of the SEC and the New Deal vision of
large· scale corporate reorganization, see Skeel , supra note 6 r.
21 8
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governmental oversight in bankruptcyY 0 By calling for SEC regulation of the con±1icts problem, progressive scholars could encourage
Congress to reinvigorate the role of government oversight on troublesome bankruptcy issues. 221
As with bankruptcy attorneys, one can also imagine a v igoro us
progressive critique of the role of managers in the failure of large co rporations - es pecially given the \videspread concerns about managers' ability to use Chapter r r strategically. 22 2 Rather than defending
current law, vvhich permits m a nagers to continue to run the firm in
bankruptcy, progressives might insist on close scrutiny of the rnanagers
of a failing firm. (Criticism of managers' continued role \Vas, of
course, a constant refrain of the SEC study overseen by VVilliam
Douglas. 223 ) As an alternative to simply leaving managers in place,
Congress could authorize the SEC to determine at the start of a case
whether the firm's existing managers should be retained or replaced. 224
Progressives might further call for Congress to limit managers' ability
to use the bankruptcy process to derail derivative litigation against
them. 225
Progressive scholars could also take a much more aggressive stance
on protecting employees. Surprisingly few progressives - a prominent
exception being Vern Countryman himself22 6 - have insisted that em-

220 Under the I938 Chandler Act amendments, the court co uld not confirm a reorganization
plan in a Chapter X case until the SEC had issued a report on the proposal. The I 978 Code left
the SEC with little role in co rporate reorga ni zation. See id.
221 Thus, Congress migh t authorize the SEC to use its rulemaking process to develop conflicts
rules. This delegation wo uld diminish the ad hoc quality of the existing case law and would permit an ongoing respon se to conflicts problems. The SEC mig ht also play a useful role in regulating claims trading and related issues.
222 The most prominent accounts (neither by legal academics) are DELANEY, supra note 103
(strategic bankruptcy), and SOBOL, supra note 106 (the A.H . Robins case). I t is important to emphasize , however, that Chapter I I is not a picnic for the debtor's managers. Many manage rs are
replaced before the end of the reo rgani zation process. See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Bow·ds,
Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control Wh en Finns
Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 373-79 (1990). Nevertheless, managers clearly fare better in
Chapter I I than under prior law.
223 Se e supm pp. I089-90.
224 Regul ators have precisely this authority in bank and insurance inso lvency cases (w hi ch are
not governed by the Bankruptcy Code). In both contexts, there is a strong presumption that
managers should be remo ved. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § I83 1o(f)(2)( F )(ii) (I994). Progressives might
call for a similar but less draconian approac h in bankruptcy.
225 Existing bankruptcy law sharply limits the effectiveness of derivative litigation alleging that
a debtor's managers have breached their fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs' attorn eys who have brought
litigation against the managers before bankruptcy, for in stance, ofte n abandon the litigation due
to the proced ura l obstacles posed by bankruptcy law. I have di sc ussed th ese problems at length in
other work. See David A. Skeel, Jr., R ethinking the Line Between Cm·porate Law and Co1·porate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 4/I, 498-5 06 (I994).
22 6 See Douglas Bordewiec k & Vern Countryman, Th e R ejection of Collective Bargaining
Ag,-eements by Chaptn I I Debtors, 57 Aivi. BANKR. L.J. 293, 299-300 (1983).
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ployees' collective bargainin g rights should be fully protected in bankruptcy. (lVIany, includin g Elizab eth Warren , suggest that these rights
should be balanced against other concern s.ZZ 7 ) In addition to collective
bargaining rights, progressives might explore oth er protections for employees. O ne intri guing possibility, whi ch Pe nnsylvani a has adopted in
the corporate anti takeover context, is mandatory "tin pa rachute" provisions that would pro tec t employees laid off shortly after a firm' s reorganization. 228
An ob vious response to these suggestions - closely parall eling arguments that progress ive scholars have m ade in the corp orate law context - is that the best way to pr otect employees and investors is by
promoting teorganization , even if this ap proach incide ntally benefits
corporate m anagers and the bankruptcy bar. Le aving mana gers of
troubled firms in place encourages them to invo ke bankruptcy, for instance, and smooths the way to reorganiz ation. The reorganization in
turn benefits employees and others because it keeps the firm in busin ess. 229
Although this is a plausible defense of current progressive thin king,
it is far from conclusive. First, it is hardly certain that the proposals I
suggest, such as closer scrutiny of managers and greater protection of
employees, would seriou sly interfere with reorganization . M oreover,
progressives have traditionally taken the view that shifting the balance
of power away from managers and tow ard employees is important
enough to justify any chilling effect.2 30

227 See Wa rren, Bankmptcy Policy , supra note r q, a t 792 ("[T jhe Code suggests tha t th e distr ibutional aim of ba nkru ptcy should be tai lored to the fa cts of th e case - permi tting impai rme n t
of labor contracts if it is esse ntial fo r a successful reorgani zatio n and rejecti ng it if it is not. ").
228 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2581 - 83 (1995). T he Pen nsylva nia provisions provide co mpensati on
for em p loyees who are laid off within six months of a takeove r. To be effecti ve in a subsequent
bankruptcy, such provisions would need to be give n p riority stat us.
22 9 Co rporate law progressives have made similar argum ents in de fen se of antitakeove r stat utes
such as "other co nsti tuency" pro visions that permi t th e ma nagers of a firm th a t is the target of a
ta keo ve r bid to consider factors other than stoc k value in decidi ng whet her to reject t he bid. Although these p rovisions stre ngth en m anagers' hand s, p rog ressive sc hol ars see th em as also be nefitin g employees an d the local co mmun ity. See, e.g., Law rence E. M itc hell , A Theoretical and
Practical Framew ork for Enforcing Corporate Co nstitue ncy S tatut es, 70 T EX. L. REV . 579 (199 2).
Co rpora te prog ressives also sha re with ba!lkruptcy progressives a n increasing emph asis on co mmunita rian v alues. S ee GROSS, supra note 22 (bankruptcy); PROG RE SSIVE CORP ORAT E LAW
(Law rence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
230 In the legislati ve hearings on th e Chan d ler Act, fo r instance, William D ouglas ignored lawyers' com plai nts th at the m and a tory trustee req uirement would cause managers to avoid bankrup tcy at all costs. Only a strong measure, he maintained , wo uld solve the problems w ith existin g
law. Douglas insisted that the in volvem ent of an independe nt tru stee was "the keystone of th[e]
p rogra m." R evision of the Bankruptcy Act: H earing on H.R . 6439 Before the H ouse Comm. on
the Ju d iciary , 75th Co ng. 163-64, 175-77 (HJ37) (statement of Willia m D ouglas).
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Second, and more interesting, t he defense of current progressive
thinking focuses on the time after a firm has filed for banl;c·uptcy.231
i-\t this point, reorganization seems to benefit non-shareholder constituencies because it keeps the firm afloat. Employees therefore keep
their jobs, and the local community retains the benefits of the firm's
presence. If one considers employees' perspective before the firm runs
into trouble, however, the situation looks quite different. Bankr uptcy
ru les that punish managers and thus discourage ban kruptcy ;n2,y c;.ctually give managers a povverful incentive to avoid financ ial diEic u.lty in
the first instance. A manager who knows she vvill be removed in the
event of bankru ptcy is li kely to be more cautious v;hile the firm is
}Jealthy than one who knows her control will contim1e. 232
][ have
shov.rn in detail elsewhere, this is precisely what we see in nations such
as Germany and Japan, whose fi rms place a much greater ernphasis on
employee job security and other non-shareholder interests than U.S.
firms do. 233 Outside of the United States, stringent bankruptcy lavvs
and progressive corporate law almost always go hand in hand.
Let me emphasize that I am not trying to d isplace the current progressive view altogether. One can credibly argue that reorganization
practice has been cleaned up and the world has changed so much since
the r 930s that the early progressives' concerns simply do not apply in
the same way. Yet it also seems clear that contemporary progressives'
ties to the corporate bankruptcy bar, their grounding in perspectives
taken from personal bankruptcy, and their academic battles with the
law and economics movement figure prominently in their fierce loyalty
to the reorganization framework established in 1978. This history suggests that the current reorganization framework could benefit from a
different progressive critique, one that sounds more like that of William Douglas and Vern Countryman.
CONCLUSION

Vern Countryman is a remarkable figure in twentieth-century legal
academia generally and in bankruptcy in particular. He was anointed
early on as the heir to William Douglas, the most important progressive bankruptcy scholar of the century. Thereafter, he left his mark on
every corner of bankruptcy theory and practice. Countryman's definition of an executory contract has served as the touchstone for numer23! Douglas Baird makes a somewhat similar point. See Baird, supra note I iS, at 589; see also
Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REv. r, r2-r4 (emphasizing the importance of ex ante effects).
2 3 2 Somewhat counterintuitively, harsh bankruptcy laws tend to encourage relational governance outside of bankruptcy and a less market-driven approach to corporate law generally. See
Skeel, supra note 30, at 1339-46.
233 See id.
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ous court dec isions and every subsequent academic discussion on the
subject. N ot only was Countryman a charter member of the consum er
protection movement, he also played a pivotal role in persuading the
bankr uptcy b:u to support, and Congress to adopt, important protections for consurners in bankruptcy. Countryman wrote a groundbre aking bankru ptcy casebook, participated prominently in the bar 's
lecoding organi zations , testified regularly before Con gress, wrote briefs
fo r importan ': cc.ses, and au thored numerous influen tial articles.
Underlying all of Countryman's efforts \Vas a longstanding commitment to
liberties. Countryman's core values w ere evident
from the b ::ginrti ng of hi s career, in his unyield ing support of t he defend:=mts in the Ioyalty cases of the I 950s. They also in formed his persistent carnpaign on behalf of consumer debtors . M ore than those of
any other ac ademic, Vern Countryman's commitments have colored
the thinking of current progressive bankruptcy scholars . Like Countryman, more recent progressives promote the interests of individual
debtors and a broadly construed fresh start, often join forces with the
bankruptcy bar, and resist the incursions of law and economics. I
have argued that the progressive vision has been distorted in some respects in its translation to the present. But this disconnect should not
obscure the important continuities. Progressive theory has retained
both its vitality and its influence in the work of Elizabeth Warren and
other current progressives; and there is little question where , and from
whom, their inspiration came.

